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Abstract 
Advancements in the application of international refugee laws, European Union and 
national asylum legislations has increased the protection for refugees and asylum 
seekers from sexual minorities. With point of departure in the German administrative 
court’s credibility assessment dealing with asylum/refugee appeal cases relating to 
sexual orientation, the aim of this study is to explore the epistemological relation 
between the sexual psychology and legal decision-making. The overall objective of this 
study is posed through the problem of ‘how does knowledge derived from the sexual 
psychological science become constituent in the German credibility assessment dealing 
with asylum/refugee appeal cases relating to sexual orientation and what mechanisms 
are present when governing refugees from sexual minorities?’.  
By using a discourse analysis as methods for the empirical court verdicts and Michel 
Foucault’s archaeology as analytical grip, this study seeks to investigate what kind of 
knowledge counts as relevant criteria and preconditions for the interpretation of the law 
‘‘membership of a particular social group’. In addition, it will be explored by what 
kinds of techniques and mechanisms law and legal decision-making become modes to 
objectify that categorise individuals and thereby achieve its ‘truth effects’. Finally, this 
study seeks to examine how this knowledge is constituted in the governing of refugees 
from sexual minorities.  
This study shows that the sexual psychological science constitutes itself as a natural 
and necessary epistemological dimension in the German credibility assessment, 
determining and affecting the categories, criteria and sexual stereotypes that occur in 
connection to the law ‘membership of a particular social group’. The proposed liberal 
rights for asylum seekers and refugees denote hence a regulated freedom. 
 
Keywords: Germany, credibility assessment, sexual orientation, membership of a 
particular social group, discourse analysis, Michel Foucault, archaeology, sexual 
psychology, stereotypes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“The essential point is that sex was not only a matter of sensation and pleasure, of law 
and taboo, but also of truth and falsehood [...] in short, that sex was constituted as a 
problem of truth.” 
(Foucault 1978) 
Every year, thousands of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, transgender and intersex 
(LGBTTI) refugees apply for international protection in the European Union (EU) seeking 
to escape discrimination, sexual assault, ill-treatment, and killings by state- and non-state 
actors (Jansen & Spijkerboer 2011). Freedom, including sexual freedoms, provided by 
human rights has become the democratic ideological foundation of the “Western” states. 
Sexual freedom revolves around the idea of self-definition and equal rights for all regardless 
of a human being’s sexual orientation or sexual identity. Although being comparatively new 
in legal decision-making, the right to obtain asylum relating to sexual orientation1 earlier has 
been stipulated by different national laws under the legal category of political asylum. Since 
2004, the EU has streamlined the right to asylum or refugee status relating to sexual 
orientation and established the causal link to the legal category of ‘membership of a 
particular social group’ (Council Directive 2004/83; Council Directive 2011/95/EU). At first 
glance this seems like a progressive and a major opportunity for the many asylum seekers 
and refugees from sexual minorities applying for protection and that seek to escape sexual 
oppressions and violence.  
Taking point of departure in the German Administrative Courts and their legal practices on 
this area, the right to obtain (political) asylum relating to sexual orientation has been 
substantiated through a landmark decision from the Federal Administrative Court in 1988. 
With reference to German administrative court decisions, literature has shown that refugees 
and asylum seekers from sexual minorities on a regular basis are required to prove their 
sexual orientations instead of the liberal idea of self-definition (Markard 2013; Dolk & 
                                                          
1 Sexual orientation’ refers to “each person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction 
to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more than 
one gender” (Yogyakarta Principles 2007; 6n1).  
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Schwantner 2007; Referat für gleichgeschlechtliche Lebensweisen 1994). The credibility 
assessment is thereby mostly undertaken through the verification of sexual psychologists 
and psychiatrists. These were before mandatory, but the German government stresses that 
these practices now are outdated (BT-Drucks. 17/8357: 5).  
However, what does it mean to prove your sexual orientation? By what means would that be 
possible? And do there exist sexual orientations, apart from those that are criminalised in 
Germany, that are not credible for the categorisation ‘membership of a particular social 
group’? These epistemological challenges point towards the aspect that certain underlying 
knowledges and truths must reduce the complex and fluctuating notion of ‘sexuality’ into a 
“singular epistemological category” (Senthorun 2010). Hence, the notion of sexual freedom 
in German legal decision-making would appear as regulated freedom with possible 
consequences for human rights and legal certainty. 
 
1.1 Aim of Study and Research Question 
With empirical point of departure in (un)published court verdicts addressing asylum/refugee 
appeal cases relating to sexual orientation, this thesis aims to make a diagnosis of the 
practices of the German administrative courts and the knowledge dimension in legal 
decision-making. Thereby, I seek to examine how sexual psychological scientific lines of 
reasoning become embedded into juridical lines of decision-making, as well as to explore 
how these knowledges are constituted and reproduced through certain techniques and 
mechanisms in legal decision-making. Especially the aspect of what kinds of knowledge and 
relationships are presented as normal, natural and necessary becomes an important relation 
to explore, since these increase the acceptance of certain (discriminatory) practices and 
decrease the possibility for critically engaging and addressing them due to its perceived 
normalcy (Taylor 2009). My main empirical material consists of selected statements within 
the German administrative courts’ (un)published verdicts on asylum/refugee appeal cases 
relating to sexual orientation during the period 2004 – 2015, as well as a landmark decision 
from 1988 ruled by the German Federal Administrative Court [Bundesverwaltungsgericht]. 
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This decision has binding effects on political and legal institutions. Further, I will use 
different parliament [Bundesrat] inquiries. 
In order to examine the knowledge dimension stemming from the relationship between the 
German judiciary and the sexual psychological science in asylum/refugee appeal cases 
relating to sexual orientation, my analytical framework will be based on a discourse analysis 
entailing an archaeology inspired by Michel Foucault. Following Foucault’s analytical 
inquiry, which overall takes departure in poststructuralism, I will investigate the practices 
for the production of (scientific) truths and knowledge within German legal decision-making 
that deal with cases relating to sexual orientation under the law ‘membership of a particular 
social group’. Hereunder, I will analyse by what kinds of techniques and mechanisms law 
and legal decision-making achieve its ‘truth effects’ and how this knowledge is constituted 
in the governing of refugees from sexual minorities. This study is therefore not concerned 
with the outcome of the verdicts, as more factors play into the possibility to obtain asylum 
or refugee status. Instead, I will focus solely on the credibility assessment which revolves 
around the plaintiff’s need to prove the own sexual orientation, instead of the liberal 
approach of self-definition. 
Based on the aims of this study, I formulate my research question as followed: 
How does knowledge derived from the sexual psychological science become constituent in 
the German credibility assessment dealing with asylum/refugee appeal cases relating to 
sexual orientation and what mechanisms are present when governing refugees from sexual 
minorities? 
In order to provide an answer to my research question, I will make use of three working 
questions that will guide my analysis. The scientific school of the epistemological stance 
which I have chosen as the basis for my study, has inspired me to formulate my further 
working questions as a discourse analysis identifies and discuss the following underlying 
questions: “What is valid knowledge at a certain place and time? How does this knowledge 
arise and how is it passed on? What functions does it have for constituting subjects? What 
consequences does it have for the shaping of society?” (Wodak & Meyer 2011: 23/33). 
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Hence, I have designed these working questions so that I can integrate the what kinds of 
knowledge influences the credibility assessment in cases of sexual orientation and how this 
knowledge is operationalised so as to have an impact on the sexual minority plaintiff as well 
as German jurisprudence. 
Working question 1: 
 
What kind of knowledge counts as relevant criteria and 
precondition when interpreting the law on ‘membership of a 
particular social group’ as part of the credibility assessment in 
German legal decision-making? 
Working question 2: 
 
What kind of modes of objectification as techniques are present as 
part of the credibility assessment in German legal decision-
making and how do these operate? 
Working question 3: 
 
Which mechanisms are present in German legal decision-making 
when dealing with asylum/refugee appeals cases relating to sexual 
orientation and how do these operate? 
 
1.2 Overview of the Thesis 
This first Chapter 1 presents an introduction, the aim and research question of this study, as 
well as a literature review of the scholarly contributions, methodological shortcomings and 
the relevance of this study to the discipline of/state of the arts of sociology of law. Chapter 
2 outlines my methodological and theoretical framework entailing an exposition of my 
analytical concepts and tools applied, as well as reflections concerning methods of 
knowledge and data generations, as well as ethical considerations.  Chapter 3 constitutes 
the core of this study as this entails my analysis, which brings into play my empirical court 
verdicts in conjunction with my analytical framework. This chapter will be divided into 
several sub-chapters: Firstly, focusing on the reciprocal relation between the sexual 
psychological science and German legal decision-making, followed by an in-depth analysis 
of my empirical material where I trace the scientific episteme, discursive events and 
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knowledges derived from expert opinions in legal decision-making that deal with asylum/ 
refugee appeal cases relating to sexual orientation, as well an analysis of techniques and 
mechanisms in legal decision-making to govern individuals. In Chapter 4, I will conclude 
this study by summarising and providing an answer to my research question, as well as 
relating my findings to previous and future research. 
 
1.3 Literature Review: Bridging the Gaps between previous socio-legal Research and 
its Relevance for the Sociology of Law 
In the following, I will outline the different scholarly publications and reports from 
international, regional and German scholars and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
that have contributed to the discussion on the credibility assessment and sexual orientation 
in asylum/refugee cases. Most specifically, I will focus on the credibility assessment in 
refugee and asylum appeal cases relating to sexual orientation in German administrative 
courts when interpreting the law ‘membership of a particular social group’ as part of the 
German Asylum Act (1992). As this law is equally stipulated in EU law and international 
refugee law, the challenges occurring in other countries are to some extend similar to 
Germany. Although some of the scholars approach this topic from a socio-legal perspective, 
I have not found any relevant literature from the sociology of law focusing on the German 
practices of the administrative courts overall, or sexual orientation in particular. Hence, in 
the first subchapter, I will only focus on research from scholars and legal practitioners from 
the former mentioned profession that have investigated the empirical dimension of the legal 
challenges presented and through which I have gained the inspiration for addressing this 
topic from a sociology of law perspective. As a way to provide an overview of general 
approaches on the knowledge dimension in legal decision-making within the sociology of 
law, I will spend the second sub-chapter discussing these overall theoretical findings. On 
that note I want to mention, that much of the literature also includes and covers the 
challenges that refugees and asylum seekers from gender minorities, such as transsexual and 
transgender people, face. Due to the scope of my study, I will however solely focus on 
asylum/refugee claims relating to sexual orientation. 
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1.1.1 Socio-legal Contributions and Shortcomings 
The first part of my review will establish an overview of the thematic contributions and 
shortcomings in the EU and German scholarly literature on my chosen topic, followed by a 
brief outline of the three most reoccurring challenges in international research on asylum/ 
refugee application based on sexual orientation.  Finally, I will point towards potential gaps 
in socio-legal research emphasising the relevance for my analytical endeavour. As a way to 
structure this first part of my review and to display some potential empirical-theoretical gaps 
that exist for Germany on this topic in general, I will emphasise briefly the key socio-legal 
practices and challenges connected to the asylum/refugee recognition procedures relating to 
the ‘proving of sexual orientation’ in international scholarly debates. 
 
1.1.1.1 Three reoccurring Key socio-legal Issues 
After reviewing several scholarly publications focusing on cases of sexual orientation in 
asylum/refugee status determination practices and the corresponding credibility assessment, 
it became evident that a) most literature focuses on countries such as the USA, Canada, and 
Australia (see e.g. Senthorun 2011; LaViolette 2014; Berg & Millbank 2009; Birdsong 2007) 
and b) most English literature for EU member states on this topic exists on the United 
Kingdom (see e.g. Buxton 2012; Gray & McDowall 2013; Berg & Millbank 2013;  Cowen 
et al. 2011). 
Considering as a starting point, Tim Cowen et al.’s (2011) overview of three key legal issues 
reoccurring in the British refugee status determination system (Cowen et al. 2011: 62), which 
originally are taken from Nicole LaViolette’s research on Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, 
Transsexual and Intersex (LGBTTI) asylum claims in Canada conducted since 1991 
(LaViolette 2009). In light of this, Cowen et al. and LaViolette emphasise that the following 
three aspects are reoccurring challenges in the credibility assessment 
1) “The recognition of sexual orientation (…) as valid eligibility criteria for claiming 
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asylum”; 
2) “The need to prove the claimants’ sexual orientation”; 
3) “The need to prove that the claimant’s fear of being persecuted in their country of 
origin because of their sexual orientation (…) is well-founded” (Cowen et al. 
2011:62). 
In this thesis, I will however make the second challenge my focus, namely “[t]he need to 
prove the claimants’ sexual orientation”. Although criteria two and three together make up 
what legal positivists define as ‘causal link’, the following research on Germany indicate 
that the “need to prove the claimants’ sexual orientation” seems a relevant obstacle that 
refugees and asylum seekers from sexual minority face in Germany. Hence, I will continue 
this review with a direct focus on the challenges of proving the sexual orientation connected 
to the credibility assessment. 
 
1.1.1.2 From Discretion to Disbelief: Sexual Orientation and the Credibility Assessment 
While many EU member states, including Germany, for many years have practiced the so-
called ‘discretion requirement’ – this entails that authorities and judges advise the claimants 
to hide their sexual orientation in the country of origin in order to escape persecution – Jenni 
Millbank (2009a; 2009b), Louis Middelkoop (2013) and Jana Weßel (2013) for example 
discuss that some countries have shifted over to doubting whether the claimants in fact are 
LGB persons with ‘innate’ or ‘identity-forming’ characteristics that are associated with the 
law on ‘membership of a particular social group’. While there does not exist much socio-
legal research concerning this topic, it becomes observable that some judges interpret this 
through the requirement of a stable and fixed sexuality and sexual identity (see e.g. Hojem 
2009; Jansen & Spijkerboer 2011; Markard 2013; Budd 2009). 
Ending these practices, the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) ruled in 2013 
that individuals who are persecuted cannot be expected to conceal their sexual orientation in 
the country of origin in order to avoid persecution (CJEU 2013). With the binding character 
of such rulings, the German government has set forward the withdrawal from such practices 
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(Markard 2013:82). However, as Nora Markard, as well as Klaudia Dolk & Andreas 
Schwantner (2007) and Leila Mourad (2010), discuss in their research, this resulted equally 
in a shift from ‘discretion’ to ‘disbelief’, which international researchers already have 
deliberated upon (see e.g. Millbank 2009; Middelkoop 2013; and Wessel 2013). 
With reference to German administrative court verdicts, Markard (2013), Dolk & Schwank 
(2007), and the Referat für gleichgeschlechtliche Lebensweisen (1994) argue that refugees 
from sexual minority on a regular basis are required to prove their sexual orientations. The 
credibility assessment is thereby mostly undertaken through the verification of sexual 
psychologists and psychiatrists, which either is provided voluntarily or requested by the 
Administrative Courts (Markard 2013; Dolk & Schwantner 2007; Referat für 
gleichgeschlechtliche Lebensweisen 1994). The German judges seems to be divided on these 
practices, however empirical research shows that the credibility assessment is often 
connected to the provision of a sexual psychological/psychiatric expert opinions – either 
required or provided on a “voluntary” basis in order to enhance the chances within the 
credibility assessment (Kalkmann 2011; Jansen & Spijkerboer 2011; Markard 2013; Dolk & 
Schwantner 2007; Mourad 2010; Referat für gleichgeschlechtliche Lebensweisen 1994). 
The research for Germany conducted by Sabine Jansen & Thomas Spijkerboer (2011), 
McPherson et al. 2014, and Markard (2013) outline that the credibility assessment often is 
accompanied by prejudices and stereotypes that judges hold about sexual minorities. This 
runs counter to the widely held legal positivist assumptions that the practices of the judiciary 
and the resulting verdicts are neutral and objective. Jansen & Spijkerboer, Markard and 
McPherson et al., stress that decision-makers and judges measure the claimants’ narratives 
with stereotyped notions of perceived characteristics and behaviour (see e.g. Markard 2013: 
83/84; McPherson et al. 2014: 179/180). An approach that has been ruled by the CJEU on 
the 7 November 2013 judgment in joined cases C-199, C-200, and C-201 as not being in 
correspondence with EU and international human rights and refugee law. These practices 
become especially difficult for a broad range of individuals, such as lesbians, bisexuals and 
individuals who have been in former/present heterosexual relationships, those who have 
children, or just those persons who do not fit into these ‘Westernised’ stereotypes. This is 
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argued to be due to many authorities and judges understand a person’s sexuality as fixed and 
stable part of the identity (see e.g. Rehaag 2009; Cowen 2010; Spijkerboer 2013; Markard 
2013; Mourad 2010; Budd 2013; McPherson et al. 2014).  
Finally, Markard outlines that German authorities interpret the law on ‘membership of a 
particular social group’ only in terms of an “irreversible” (homo)sexual orientation. A stance 
that legally has been manifested and binding through a landmark decision from 1988 
(Markard 2013: 83). This terminology also excludes the former mentioned individuals, 
whose “sexual orientation” or “sexual identity” is not fixed or stable. Despite the existence 
of very few socio-legal researchers in Germany deliberating on/touching upon the above-
mentioned aspects and empirical examples, the research on this specific topic remains very 
scarce and covers my chosen dimensions only very briefly. 
 
1.1.1.3 Potential Gaps in socio-legal Contributions 
This overview of international, EU and German scholarly and expert debates provided, 
sought to shed light on themes and legal topics connected to the asylum and refugee status 
determination processes, its recognition practices and credibility assessment for asylum 
seekers and refugees from sexual minorities. Hereunder, I have focused on highlighting some 
of the reoccurring issues that refugees and asylum seekers from sexual minorities face in 
their application procedures. 
As pointed out, there exist some socio-legal scholars and experts emphasising the challenges 
occurring for asylum seekers and refugees from sexual minorities, but overall there exist 
very little actual research on this topic for Germany (see e.g. Markard 2013; Dolk & 
Schwantner 2007; Referat für gleichgeschlechtliche Lebensweisen 1994; and Mourad 2010). 
In particular, there exist no literature taking a sociology of law stance towards this topic. 
Consequently, the aspect of sexual psychological science being involved in the credibility 
assessment becomes especially interesting to investigate in light of my theoretical and 
methodological framework chosen. 
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1.3.2 Relevance for the Sociology of Law Discipline 
As the former presented literature review has shown, my chosen topic has not covered the 
(sexual psychological) knowledge dimension in legal decision-making. It is here where I 
will direct my focus to the shortcomings that exist on this topic, as well as outline general 
aspects relevant to the knowledge dimension within the sociology of law as discipline, 
establishing thereby the relevance of my study.  
The sociology of law has since Max Weber and Emilé Durkheim raised important questions 
concerning the reciprocal relationship between law and society. So has Pierré Bourdieu 
amongst others with his analysis of how different kinds of (legal) knowledge constitute 
different kinds of resources (Deflem 2008), while other more contemporary sociology of law 
researchers such as Matthias Beier (2014), Håkan Hydén and Måns Svensson (2008) have 
focused on the normative dimension of law. Although conventional legal jurisprudence 
acknowledge that the autonomy of law cannot always be claimed, there exist still positivist 
discourses in legal studies that consider legal knowledge in verdicts as somewhat objective 
and neutral (for a critical enquiry of this topic see e.g. Bladini 2013). 
While theoretical stances and perspectives are as manifold like each of the respective 
disciplines and sub-disciplines, the relevance of applying a Foucauldian perspective within 
the sociology of law can be found in the “comparatively little” focus that exist on the 
knowledge/discursive dimension within legal decision-making overall. For example, such 
an approach seeks to examine the practices, means and mechanisms “by which law achieves 
its ‘truth effects’” and how this knowledge is constituted in legal decision-making or in 
relation to law (Valverde cited in Nelken 2006b: 572). To name a few scholars, Maria 
Valverde (2010; 2003; Valverde & Rose 1998), David Nelken (2006a; 2006b), Nikolas Rose 
(1998), Alan Hunt & Gary Wickham (1994), as well as Ben Golder & Peter Fitzpatrick 
(2009), have been working extensively with a Foucauldian stance in the field of sociology 
of law, critical legal studies and other branches of socio-legal studies. Nonetheless, as 
Valverde argues, most sociology of law and socio-legal scholarships have been conducting 
research on “the reproduction and contestation of various forms of power relation” (Valverde 
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2003: 1). An example of such very interesting, but somewhat different approach can be 
outlined through Cynthia Hardy’s and Golder’s respective examination of the power 
dynamics in refugee determination systems, which also points to the construction of identity 
and knowledge in this process (Hardy 2003; Golder 2013). The latter also includes a focus 
on how rights within this system can be understood in a Foucauldian sense entailing liberal 
freedoms and “mechanisms of inscription” (Golder 2013). 
The domain of legal scientific knowledge has gained more and more attention in recent 
years. However, as my previous literature review has shown, there exist comparatively little 
to no research within the sociology of law that examines: how scientific lines of reasoning 
get embedded into juridical lines of decision-making in this particular field; or studies that 
examine the reciprocal relationship between (German) administrative courts and the sexual 
psychology as expert knowledge in asylum/refugee appeals cases dealing with sexual 
orientation. In extension to the theoretical and methodological shortcomings that exist 
overall concerning this topic and in relation to my geographical scope, there are especially 
theoretical and methodological shortcomings concerning my chosen field focusing on court 
verdicts.   
Due to strategic reasons, I have chosen to focus only on the archaeological side of the 
constitutions and reproduction of sexual psychological scientific knowledge and truths 
within legal decision-making. I see this as an important analytical approach for the sociology 
of law, since it reveals, amongst others, how the human sciences have developed certain 
norms of validity and objectivity creating the illusion that there exist a truth that can be 
discovered. Further, Nelken points out that courts often use different kinds of knowledge 
depending on the conclusion they wish to arrive at and that this in general requires us more 
insight into “legal procedures, functions and discursive forms of communication” (Nelken 
2006a: 601). In addition, Nelken emphasises that “[w]hat counts as legal knowledge, or 
knowledge for law, is something that changes over time. And this mainly happens outside 
the courtroom” (Ibid.: 602). My study will therefore examine how certain specific discursive 
events enable certain discourses on sexuality in asylum/refugee appeal cases to be perceived 
as natural and absolute truths. The justification of exploring such a topic within the sociology 
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of law can be outlined, amongst others, in the importance investigating how such expert 
legal opinions can be perceived as neutral, natural and necessary in legal decision-making. 
This sets the stage for an interesting discussion on how the interconnection of sex and truth 
can establish what appears to be accepted and ‘natural’ in society and creating the basis 
“upon which individual sexualities and subjectivities” can be based, is for example outlined 
by Taylor (2009). Furthermore, this is important for understanding how the categorisation 
and classification of objects by means of (sexual psychological) science and medicine can 
make certain forms of modern governance possible (Valverde 2003: 3). 
Being situated in the field of sociology of law, I hope to contribute to this debate with a new 
analytical focus, while also providing some new evidence in the form of verdicts from the 
German administrative courts in the period between 2004 and 2015. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter will outline my methodological, methodical and theoretical framework. The 
foundation of this study is thus to be found in my methodological considerations, which 
reflect both my theoretical, methodical and empirical choices. In the following, I will start 
by presenting the scientific stance and departure of this thesis, leading to a brief theoretical 
overview of Foucault’s discourse analysis and archaeological approach, as well as an 
exposition of his analytical terms relevant to this study. Subsequently, I will put forward my 
methods for the generation of my empirical material and my methodical reflections 
concerning the generation and selection of my empirical material, as well as ethical 
considerations. 
 
2.1 The Thesis’ Scientific Departure 
I will here shortly depict the social scientific stance of this study, which outlines: a) how I 
will construct other theorists’ perceptions as objects of my own epistemological reflections; 
b) how I am constructing socio-legal knowledge about the juridical practice when dealing 
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with asylum cases relating to sexual orientation in Germany. The analytical framework will 
be based on a discourse analysis entailing an archaeological method inspired by Foucault2. 
The approach belongs under the social constructionist paradigm – more specifically being 
part of the poststructuralism school of thought. Discourse analysis and archaeology are both 
of technical (methodical) and analytical character. In this first sub-chapter, I will emphasise 
how these different modes of analyses will affect my own epistemological reflections, since 
my epistemological departure has to be created in a way so that the emerging of sociality 
can be observed.  
At the heart of Foucault’s historical philosophical inquiries, he sought to present a critique 
of the perceived naturality of liberal humanism, the humanities and the social science, which 
since the period of enlightenment constructed the idea that there exists a human nature (a 
subject) in need of liberation and emancipation (Foucault 1972). In addition, he showed how 
this epistemologically sustained idea was a normalising measure and embedded in the 
ontologies of the people through scientific expertise and thereby sustained socio-historical 
constructs of power and domination (Foucault 1977). 
Hence, as a sociology of law researcher within social constructionism, (legal) “knowledge 
is not just a reflection of reality”, but instead the underlying truths in law and legal decision-
making are constructed and “different regimes of knowledge determine what is true and 
false” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 13). While knowledge in social constructionism is 
perceived as being the result of socio-cultural and socio-historical processes, the is no 
possibility to objective or neutral external reality (Constantino 2008). In addition, the post-
structuralist school of thought, or more precisely applying a Foucauldian “method” of 
discourse analysis, I am thereby not attempting any objectivity (Esmark et al. 2005). This 
implies that I, as a researcher, am not situated outside the discourses that I am analysing.  
Rather I will accept my own intersubjective realities that will be inherent in my reflections 
and research. By applying a certain methodology, methods and theoretical framework, I will 
                                                          
2 This aspect will be explained thoroughly in the following chapter. 
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construct the objects of my enquiry in a certain way so that my own position under this 
perspective will come to light through the use of certain analytical terms.  
By employing discourse analysis, I equally reject objectivism’s scientific requirements and 
understanding of the reliability and validity of my study, since they are positivist and realist 
assumptions concerning the possibility to achieve truth (Ibid.). In line with Foucault’s 
analytical approach, the human sciences developed certain norms of validity and objectivity 
and creates thereby the illusion that there exist a truth that can be discovered (Gutting 1989: 
xi). Instead, the validity of a “discourses analysis can be determined by focusing on 
coherence” where my analytical claims seek to display the discursive formations (Jørgensen 
& Phillips 2002: 125). This can be supported by Foucault’s approach holding that discourse 
analysis seeks to identify a pattern within reoccurring statements at a certain time and place 
(Foucault 1972). An aspect that becomes relevant for my approach. 
Law, legal categories and court verdicts that are connected to the judicial practices 
concerning the credibility assessment of asylum/refugee appeal cases relating to sexual 
orientation entail cultural understandings that are the historical outcomes of specific kinds 
of scientific knowledge and truths, as well as government practices. In addition, not only are 
my own reflections affected by certain epistemologies, but by using socio-legal categories 
such as ‘refugees’, ‘sexual minorities’ and ‘sexual orientation’, I am also contributing to the 
(re)production of perceived normalities and discourses around these topics. For example, 
when I in the latter use “sexual orientation”, I might also reproduce the commonly held 
binary distinction between ‘heterosexuality’ and ‘homosexuality’. The terminology of 
‘sexual orientation’ includes all kinds of sexual orientations, such as bisexuality, 
transsexuality, transgender and many more. My analysis does not include the latter two 
orientations, but touches briefly upon bisexuality as being a marginalised sexual orientation 
in legal decision-making. Hence, I equally to some extent reproduce the common sense 
binary scope.  
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The analytical concepts and terms applied in this thesis will take their point of departure in 
Foucault’s discourse analysis in conjunction with his archaeological approach. These will 
be outlined and described in the following sub-chapter. 
 
2.2 Foucault’s Discourse Analysis and archaeological Approach 
Foucault understood discourses as references to a historically and culturally regulated 
system of statements, which are not unified but dispersive, and are: 
“(…) made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of 
existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form […] it 
is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history […] posing its own limits, 
its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality” (Foucault 
1972:72). 
According to Foucault, in all periods of history, there exist various differing and competing 
discourses in the form of discursive formations that produce different kinds of knowledge 
and truths. Discourses therefore can be perceived as dispersive, differing and contingent, but 
despite this there exist a certain coherence or repetitiveness in the statements that are 
produced within a specific domain (Linstead 2010:13). Hence, only the dominant discourses 
remain visible, while the non-dominant discourses are not being reproduced. These dominant 
discourses determine in a given historical epoch what is being accepted as meaningful and 
true (Foucault 1972). The function of a discourse can thus be understood as the ability to 
communicate, as well as to classify, divide, evaluate and calculate. Thereby discourses create 
meanings/truths that explain, represent, precondition, legitimise practices and produce the 
human subject as a semantic artefact (Foucault 1972; Teubner 1989). Discursive formations 
are governed by rules beyond grammar and are defined by a particular historical ‘a priory’ 
and ‘episteme’ that underlies and informs governing practices. Knowledge for Foucault, 
hence is no longer homogenous, since different empirical sciences entail different and 
competing forms of knowledge that contain different modes of objectification and 
subjectification (Oksala 2005: 28).  
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In order to identify the discourses and discursive formations that enable certain practices, 
Foucault re-developed the analytical tool coined ‘archaeology’, which has its roots in French 
tradition of history and philosophy of science (Gutting 1989). In addition, Foucault’s 
approach to archaeology is grounded in historical practice instead of philosophical theory 
(Ibid.:xi). It is an analytical grip that seeks to describe (the emergence of) an archive, which 
is a system of statements –  both in terms of events or structures –  that encompass discourses 
and orders (Ibid.). Archaeology helps to shed light on the processes that have led to a given 
historical ‘a priori’ that underlies a given culture (Foucault 1972:126-131).  More precisely, 
Gutting describes Foucault’s archaeology as “a technique for revealing how discipline has 
developed norms of validity and objectivity” (Gutting 1989: xi). The analysis of epistemes 
is crucial in archaeology, since an episteme entails the discursive regularities of the sciences, 
denoting an epistemological field that gives rise to and legitimises certain practices (Foucault 
1972:191-192). Finally, certain kinds of knowledges and truths enable the emerging of the 
social (norms) and constitution of subjects. 
At a later stage and as an extension to his archaeological approach, Foucault developed his 
genealogical stance, inspired by Nietzsche, where he focused on the relation between power 
and knowledge. Hereunder, there is not so much a focus on the modes of objectifications 
that divide individuals into objects of governance, but genealogy as analytical dimension 
focuses on the study of subjectification, “the way a human being turns him- or herself into a 
subject” (Foucault 1982:208-226; Brion & Harcourt 2014:284). For Foucault, power is 
productive and thereby provides the conditions for the social. Both analytical dimensions 
are highly applicable to the field which I am to examine, but due strategic choices I will 
attune to the archaeology as analytical grip to my discourse analysis. In the subsequent 
chapter, I will however also outline Foucault’s analytical notion of power and its related 
technologies in order to emphasise the importance of the knowledge dimension in legal 
decision-making as it has effects on the formation and governing of subjects. Finally, this 
thesis does not aim at drawing precise lines between Foucault’s archaeological and 
genealogical approach, in ‘practice’ these are much interwoven, but for analytical and 
strategic reasons, I will emphasise the archaeological side in discourse analysis. I have 
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chosen to use an archaeology as analytical tool, since it corresponds to the former mentioned 
gaps in the sociology of law. Particular to my topic, an archaeology allows for the excavating 
of the governing episteme and the discursive regularities in German jurisprudence dealing 
with cases of sexual orientation. This epistemological fields occurring at a certain time and 
place in German legal decision-making gives rise to and legitimises certain dominant 
discourses, classifications, truths and practices in the credibility assessment upon judgment 
about the plaintiffs’ orientations are made. 
 
2.3 Power, Knowledge, Truth and Norms 
Foucault opposes the approach of a general theory of power, but sees power as originating 
from multiple and differing locations. According to his “conceptualisation”, power unfolds 
itself in a serious of discursive clusters of relationships, which assembles the “operation of 
the political technologies throughout the social body” (Foucault 1982:185). Hence, power is 
more to be understood as analytics of power upon which certain technologies, techniques 
and mechanisms are working and through which one can identify how various discourse 
operate (Ibid.). Contrary to ontological or normative perspectives on power, Foucault 
addresses the functioning of power: “What I have been trying to look at (…) is the ‘‘how’’ 
of power. Studying the ‘‘how of power,’’ or in other words trying to understand its 
mechanisms” (Foucault cited in Golder 2012:24). In order to understand power, it is 
suggested by Foucault, that we must focus on the microphysics of power that are day to day 
operations as well as political and juridical technologies in which these practices are formed 
(Foucault 1982). Further, Foucault wants us to understand that although power can at times 
resume a sovereign top-down character, it mostly takes on productive forces that work in 
multiple directions and is reliant upon a regulated freedom (Ibid.: 790).  
Foucault identified different technologies or kinds of power (sovereign, disciplinary, bio-
politics and governmentality) throughout the ‘history’ of humanity and despite them 
comprising different eras, they overlap and can occur simultaneously in different areas in 
modernity. What Foucault perceives as the technology of power in modern society is 
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discipline. It can further be read that the disciplining of individuals, and thus the population, 
has nothing to do with the hypothesis of repressive power. This also changes the means by 
which law operates – an aspect that will be developed further in the forthcoming chapter. 
Modern disciplinary technologies constitute their objects of control through examination, 
measurements and categories and simultaneously exercise power upon and through the soul 
of human beings; that is the individual subjectivity (Oksala 2010). This is what Foucault 
refers to when he talks about the mode of power being productive by creating techniques 
and mechanisms that are disciplining as well as normalising subjects. 
As knowledge is such a significant component in the relationship of technologies of power 
– which has as its effect the objectification and subjectification of the individual – the ways 
in which knowledge is constituted is important to Foucault (Oksala 2005; Dean 2003). In 
line with Foucault’s analytics, I will therefore extract by means of my archaeology as 
analytical tool the scientific episteme and scientific categories underlying the court verdicts 
in question, which might inform legal decision-making. According to Foucault, the scientific 
knowledge about the population – and about the individual – is a construction of truth 
(Foucault 1970).  
Contrary to liberal humanism, which since the period of enlightenment constructed the idea 
that there exists a human nature (a subject) in need of liberation and emancipation, Foucault 
explains the notion of subjectivity was firstly invented and became a field of intervention in 
the eighteenth century through the human sciences (Foucault 1970:308). Hence, the 
scientifically constructed truth imposes itself on the games of power; on the totalising and 
individualising techniques, as well as normalising mechanism. The latter denotes different 
means that foster an illusionary “normal state of being” in contrast to what is perceived in 
society as abnormal (Foucault 2000: 59).  It is the notion of truth and its relation to 
subjectivity that concerns Foucault the most; his main objective of study is to show “(...) 
how the subject constituted itself, in one specific form or another, as a mad or a healthy 
subject, as a delinquent or non-delinquent subject, through certain practices that were also 
games of truth, practices of power (...)” (Foucault 1994:290). He therefore continues by 
noting that he had to pose “(...) the problem of knowledge and power (...) [as] an instrument 
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that makes it possible to analyse the problem of the relationship between subject and truth” 
(Ibid.). Although, my forthcoming analysis will not focus on this subjective side, the aspect 
of scientific constructed truths and the categories from which individuals can be classified 
and objectified poses an important part of this study and make possible the internalisation of 
(scientific) norms. After all, for Foucault, power and knowledge are intrinsically related: 
“We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (...) that power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. (Foucault 1977:27-28). 
Having established this reciprocal relation, it becomes even more important to bear this 
perspective in mind when generating new research within the sociology of law. Thus, law 
and legal decision-making in certain situations need to rely on knowledge from other 
profession for its truth effects, while other professions rely on law for extending its 
epistemological certitude and authority to impact social cohesion (Golder & Fitzpatrick 
2009: 63). An aspect that will be central for my upcoming analysis where I will investigate 
the reciprocal relationship between the sexual psychological science and German 
administrative courts dealing with the credibility assessment for asylum/refugee appeal cases 
relating to sexual orientation.  
Finally, the concept of norms has taken up a crucial role as mechanism to disperses and 
normalise certain knowledges and a means to govern individuals. In a Foucauldian 
perspective, a norm is not a stigma, as Goffman (1963) defined it; instead norms, can be 
understood as a comparative measure or standard that arises from social practices and is 
articulated through the human science. Norms thereby “aim to distribute individuals on a 
continuum from normal to abnormal” (Golder & Fitzpatrick 2009: 43n43). Foucault has 
outlined several times in his intellectual oeuvre that power is productive; hence 
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“(…) the norm brings with it a principle of both qualification and correction. The norm's 
function is not to exclude and reject. Rather, it is always linked to a positive technique 
of intervention and transformation, to a sort of normative project” (Foucault 2003: 50). 
Norms are therefore no rules or principles that are explicitly codified and are thereby not 
articulated through legal institutions in general (Ibid.). In contrast to the law, 
stereotypes/norms do not distinguish between what is legal or illegal, but they are formative 
of an individual’s subjectivity through establishing a sense of being “normal” (Ibid) and seek 
to “qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize” (Foucault 1978: 144). To my knowledge, 
Foucault has not focused on stereotypes as an analytical term; instead, I will argue that 
stereotypes can be understood in a similar vein as Foucault’s analytical term of ‘norms’ and 
will therefore also be applied as such in my analysis. 
 
2.4 Expert Knowledge in legal Decision-Making and the Penal System 
As the modes of punishment from the 16th Century on onwards gradually changed from 
corporal punishment to a punishment of the ‘soul’ (a practice already intensified by 
Christianity), the emergence of the human sciences, such as psychiatry and later psychology, 
rendered the ‘soul’ into an object of study and a field for technical intervention (Foucault 
2003)3. Hence, knowledge about the individual as well as the distribution of knowledge 
becomes of importance in the exercise of disciplinary power. This implies a transformation 
from ways of knowing into ways of being; that is, how scientific epistemologies about the 
population become ingrained in the ontology of this very same population (Foucault 
1977:203).  
This change in power, equally, had an impact on legal decision-making, which on one hand 
enabled the separation of the population (dividing technique) into legal categories such as 
legal, illegal, normal/abnormal, sane/mad, etc., but on the other hand also could judgement 
                                                          
3 Foucault’s own empirical analysis focused on the relationship between the birth of the clinic, the birth of 
the prison and penal institutions, that together created the dangerous individual. 
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upon those individuals who had committed a crime against society and was dangerous to the 
social body but which somehow fell outside the legal categories (Golder & Fitzpatrick 2009; 
Foucault 2014). Although law still could operate as a technology of domination (totalising), 
legal decision-making equally could become a mode of objectification that supported 
medical and psychiatric interventions, which in the nineteenth century became routine in 
penal practices (Foucault 1977; 2014). On the contrary, the psychiatric knowledge could 
equally support a given verdict, which gave the psychiatric science the power to make 
judgement that were supported by a judge who ruled that the dangerous individual was 
insane in the moment of crime (Foucault 2003). Further, Punishment was not prison, but the 
asylum which was often under the complete rule of the psychiatrist. According to Foucault, 
through the emergence of expert psychiatric opinions in legal decision-making and 
legitimised through the scientific “standards” of knowledge production, it was possible to 
extend the punitive power to something that was originally not a breach of law. Thereby, it 
became “possible to transfer the point of application of punishment from the offense defined 
by the law to criminality evaluated from a psychologico-moral point of view” (Davidson 
2003: xxiii). Foucault describes this mode of objectification as: 
“(…) a technique, a form of power [that] applies itself to immediate everyday life 
which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to 
his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which 
others have to in recognize him” (Foucault 1982:212). 
Especially the aspect of stating and finding out the truth about individuals became the point 
of intersection where the judicial institutions of the court and the scientific knowledge of 
experts merged and developed towards new techniques and mechanisms. In addition, by 
establishing a reciprocal and dynamic relationship, it was possible that “statements (…) 
[could be] formulated having the status of true discourses with considerable judicial effects” 
(Foucault 2003:11):  
Further, a shift occurred “from legal punishment, to a realm of objects of a knowledge, a 
technique of transformation, a whole set of rational and concerted coercions” that could 
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transform and discipline individuals within a normative framework (Foucault 2003:18). As 
Foucault outlines in his Abnormal Lectures at the Collège de France 1974-1975, expert 
psychiatric/psychological opinions in legal decision-making situates itself at the nexus point 
“between the social norms and rules and medical analysis of abnormalities” and which 
through written expert opinions or witness statements in courts becomes the science and 
technique of abnormal individuals/abnormal conduct (Ibid.:162-163). Or put differently, 
psychiatry/psychology now underpins two different areas of expertise, namely the medical 
science focusing on the disorder of nature (the norm vs. the pathological and morbid) and 
the judiciary concentrating on the disorder of law (the norms vs. irregularity and disorder) 
(Foucault 2003: 162-163). Thereby, psychiatry/psychology aims to distribute individuals on 
a continuum from normal to abnormal” (Foucault 2003: 162-163; Golder & Fitzpatrick 
2009: 43n43). 
The psychiatry delivered to law and criminal justice a whole new range of 
symptomatological field of knowledge through all kinds of disorders, deviances and 
abnormal behaviours and identities always in contrast to the (moral/ethical) norm. By relying 
on the knowledge provided by the human science – made calculable through its scientific 
standards, examination reports, tables, cases and statistics – law/legal decision-making is 
able to operate on a general horizon of truth (Foucault 2003:1977). On the contrary to the 
advantages provided by the psychiatry to law/legal decision-making, Golder & Fitzpatrick 
argue in their book Foucault’s Law (2009) that “(…) disciplinary power’s knowledge is 
ultimately lacking in its epistemological reach and its extravagant claims to encompass a 
totality” (p: 63). Hence, Golder and Fitzpatrick stress in line with Foucault that it is law and 
legal decision-making that can serve as a transcendent reference point for disciplinary 
power’s normative project in modernity, which through law’s authority can connect the 
knowledge of the individual to the totality of society (Ibid.:62-67). Finally, in their 
relationship with each other, and sometimes perceived from the outside as contrary to each 
other, both law/legal decision-making and the disciplinary power (psychiatry/psychology) 
engage in a reciprocal relationship by constituting each other as natural and necessary.  
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While each of the respective powers can operate within their ‘original’ fields of expertise, 
i.e. law can operate as a mode of objectification dividing individuals into objects of 
governance and expert opinions can both be objectifying through scientific classifications 
and subjectifying through individual examinations, in legal decision-making both powers 
can converge. Thereby, knowledge can more easily become dispersed, it can regulate and 
normalise what becomes ‘natural’ behaviour and commons sense knowledge for the 
individual and society outside the legal scope. This is an important feature for my own 
analytical approach since I will investigate what is represented by the German administrative 
courts as a true and credible sexual orientation under the law ‘membership of a particular 
social group’; which sexual orientations are normalised and pathologised; what specific 
evidence is used and what is left out. 
 
2.5 Sexuality, Law and Norms 
In Foucault’s analysis, the discourse on sexuality has been rooted in the Christian penance 
of the Middle Ages to present day alleged discourses on ‘self-emancipation’; a pivotal point 
of departure for the production of knowledge and truths, as well as the governing of 
individuals in modernity.  
Foucault describes in ‘Scientia Sexualis’ of his book The History of Sexuality, Volume I, how 
the Christian ritual of confession came to function within the “norms of scientific regularity” 
that produce and establish an ordered system of knowledge and truths, as well as an economy 
of pleasure in the nineteenth century (Foucault 1978). Contrary to widely held Victorian 
perception of ‘sexuality’ being something that was repressed, despite the legal dimension of 
this, Foucault argues that there occurred a proliferation and multiplication of ways to speak 
about sex and sexuality. Thereby the obscure ‘nature’ of sexuality “compels the individuals 
to articulate their sexual peculiarity – no matter how extreme” (Foucault 1978:61). While 
the ritual of penance in the beginning did not involve obligatory confession, this changed 
substantially in the seventeenth and eighteen centuries where individuals were obliged to 
confess absolutely everything without retention. This obligation to confess remained an 
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important technique in scientific practices, which in return also was a substantial element in 
the production of knowledge within penal practice. 
Further, this transformation into a scientific discourse also changed the form of confession 
from something that the subject wished to hide (from a moral Christian point of view) to 
something that was hidden from the individual, as it resembled the most inner secret of the 
self or the personal identity structure (Foucault1978:65). This could only be deciphered, 
interpreted and verified through a psychiatric (and later psychologist) examination. As a 
result, sexuality and the knowledge derived from scientific examinations created new 
pathological processes and different kinds of sexual deviances and abnormalities that 
required therapeutic or normalising interventions by psychiatrists/psychologists, always in 
relation to a so called norm and ‘normal sexual development’ (Ibid.:68-69). This 
accompanied equally a psychiatric shift in around 1870, a time that defined sexual 
abnormalities or deviances as “immoral acts, a temporary deviation of the norm” and from 
1880/1890 to “an innate morbid condition” (Oosterhuis 2012:133; Foucault 1978:168). 
According to Foucault, in the beginning there appeared only some cases of sexual abnormal 
individuals in scientific reviews, however soon after this became the leading etiological 
principle which defined almost all kinds of abnormality (Foucault 2003: 168). Along these 
lines, by pathologising certain sexual behaviours and identities, there occurred a 
normalisation of the requirement to speak about different kinds of sexual attractions and 
desires. As described briefly in the foregoing part, psychiatry as important source of 
knowledge in legal decision-making became the science of and correctional technique for 
abnormal individuals and abnormal conduct, which explained crimes and other social 
deviances through a discourse of morbid sexuality.  
These changes described above similarly occurred in Germany during the end of the 19th 
century and it was through the work of notable German sexologist, such as Krafft-Ebing4, 
                                                          
4 According to Oosterhuis, Krafft-Ebing as a German sexologist can be seen as the founder of the modern 
concept of sexuality (Oosterhuis 2012). Krafft-Ebing wrote his scientific books Psychopathia Sexualies as 
manual for doctors and lawyers. 
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Moll5, Westphal6 and Hirschfeld. These figures have not only bee prominent experts in 
German legal decision-making, but Foucault equally saw how their knowledges and truths 
impacted modern discourses of sexuality (Foucault 1978; Oosterhuis 2012: 134). By 
applying a Foucaultian stance to the works of Krafft-Ebing and Moll, Oosterhuis and 
Domaier argue that these German sexologists offered new labels and categories of sexual 
abnormalities, and thereby enabled that new and different ‘perversions’ could be diagnosed, 
categorised and discussed (Oosterhuis 2012; Domaier 2007). In addition, these sexual 
scientists also introduced and dispersed the terminology of ‘contrary sexual feelings’ 
(inversions) or ‘homosexuality’ (versus heterosexuality) to the legal professions and the 
wider public (Ibid.). In line with Foucault, Oosterhuis stresses that their scientific approach 
defined homosexuality or ‘psychosexual hermaphroditism’ (bisexuality) as “morbid-like 
(krankhafte) modiﬁcations of the normal sexual drive”, but simultaneously they also 
contributed to an initial normalisation of different forms of sexualities (Oosterhuis 2012:146; 
Foucault 1978; Foucault 2003). Having this in mind, this makes the analysis of the 
relationship between the German administrative courts and German sexual psychology in 
my current cases a relevant aspect to explore. For many years to come, the knowledge 
derived from sexual psychologists, either through sexual scientists as court witnesses or 
written expert opinions, remained through the work of Krafft-Ebing, Moll and Westphal an 
objective mean to access and obtain reliable evidence and truths during legal decision-
making (Oosterhuis 2012). 
Finally, through the convergence between scientific expertise and law/legal decision-making 
there occurred not only new labels and categories of sexual dispositions, identities and 
abnormalities, but the problem of sexuality appeared more and more as a ‘natural’ 
phenomena in German legal decision-making (Oosterhuis 2012). The transformation of sex 
into discourse became the fundamental issue in society around which objectifying and 
                                                          
5 Albert Moll, equally a German sexologist, wrote books such as Die Conträre Sexualempfindung: Mit 
Benutzung amtlichen Materials (1891) and Handbuch der Sexualwissenschaften mit besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der kulturgeschichtlichen Beziehungen (1911). 
6 See for example Westphal‘s book (1870). Die contrare Sexualempfindung, Symptome eines neuropathischen 
(psychopathischen) Zustand," Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten. 
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subjectifying techniques and mechanisms were organised (Foucault 2014: 258). According 
to Oksala, Foucault thereby shows “how our belief in a true sexual nature is a disciplinary 
mode of knowledge that makes us objects of control as well as subjects of sexuality7” 
(Oksala 2010: 4). Finally, in order to obtain knowledge about a person’s sexuality, sexual 
scientific expertise (also in legal decision-making) became “synonymous with having access 
to truth” (Taylor 2009: 57).  
Although, I will refrain from focusing on the actual narratives provided by the 
refuges/asylum seekers, this aspect will be an interesting perspective to explore. Also, the it 
becomes interesting to see why sexual psychologist still act as experts in decision-making 
that deal with other areas than the penal code.  
 
2.6 Methods of Data Generation 
The following section is divided into the collection and selection of my empirical material 
in order to outline the choices made and challenges met acquiring my empirical materials. 
In addition, I will briefly reflect upon ethical considerations. 
 
2.6.1 Generation of Empirical Material 
I started the process of generating my empirical material by looking at the empiria that my 
literature reviewed had included. Although this only makes up a small portion of cases 
applicable, this offered an idea of what kind of statements were occurring in the court 
verdicts that described the legal category of ‘particular social group’. Hence, I searched for 
further verdicts from the same Administrative Courts that I originally was directed towards. 
Most databases enabled the search via key words and by typing the wording such as 
“homosexuality” and “bisexuality” into some of the different German Administrative 
                                                          
7 For Foucault, the discourse on sexuality equally had impact on ethics as practice, which implies the ways 
through which individuals constitute themselves as moral subject their own action (Oksala 2010: 160). Due to 
my archaeological framework chosen, I will thus not focus on this dimension. 
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Courts’ databases, only very few court verdicts came to my attention8. Although this might 
be a general challenge when doing research on court verdicts s and case laws overall, the 
aspect that there existed very few cases dealing with asylum/refugee appeal cases relating to 
sexual orientation nevertheless struck me. Due to the scope of this study and the aspect that 
there exist approximately 52 Federal Administrative Courts in Germany, I selected therefore 
those verdicts that suited my topic and I will use them as exemplifying cases. These seek 
“(...) to capture the circumstances and conditions of an everyday or commonplace situation” 
(Bryman 2008:56). However, by rejecting the positivist and realist assumption of an 
objective and or external world that can be shown through research. Hence, although my 
selected court cases might display a commonplace legal situation, they are still an outcome 
of “historically and culturally situated social process” (Constantino 2008). 
Through the communication with the Administrative Court Berlin, I was offered the 
possibility to acquire access to some unpublished court files covering my topic. Here 
through, I was able to review 10 unpublished asylum cases that appealed their 
asylum/refugee cases relating to sexual orientation. As earlier mentioned, a discourse 
analysis does not necessarily require a representative amount of documents; instead, the 
focus is on the regularity of the statements that underlie certain discourses. Consequently, I 
had to delimit myself to a tangible size of empirical material. When crosschecking the 
database of the Administrative Court Berlin with the court files that I was given, it became 
evident that only few were published online and thereby not accessible for the wider public9. 
While conducting this process some interesting thoughts occurred to me which I briefly will 
deliberate on. Upon questioning the Federal Administrative Court Berlin, they emphasised 
that only the most important or significant cases were published online. This was done in 
order to minimise the amount of “repetitive cases online” and although, the oral proceedings 
are open for the public, only very few information is being dispersed about when and where 
oral proceedings take place. With a verdict by the Federal Administrative Court from 1997, 
                                                          
8 Due to the scope of this study and the empirical data at hand, I am not including asylum/refugee appeal cases 
based on gender identity.  
9 For extended information, please see the chapter on ‘ethical consideration’. 
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it was ruled that all verdicts from the various German courts should be made publicly 
available, since the publication of court verdicts is a public affair (BVerwG 1997, 6 C 3.96). 
Although these were not published on their own homepage, it is possible to obtain these 
verdicts through external operators that require a payed membership. Yet, the limited amount 
of court decisions available presents to me an important argument for why the study of court 
verdicts is of importance for the sociology of law and other social sciences. In addition, this 
gap in information concerning this topic available, indicates that some knowledge stemming 
from the German judiciary and the immigration authorities was not intended to be public. 
Consequently, this is an aspect that could pave the way for further research on my topic and 
the general judicial practices when dealing with different kinds of refugee and asylum 
seekers. 
 
2.6.2 Selection of Empirical Material 
In order to identify the discursive practices and to trace the underlying scientific episteme, 
political rational, categories for sexuality applicable, and narratives of truths within the 
German legal decision-making dealing with asylum/refugee appeal cases based on sexual 
orientation, I will make use of qualitative research tools. The primary empirical sources that 
I based my analysis on can be consolidated as follows: 
 (Un)published court decisions/verdicts [Beschlüsse/Urteile] by selected German 
courts (Administrative Courts and Federal Administrative Court)10; 
 The German Asylum Act 1992, EU Council Directive 2004/83, and EU Council 
Directive 2011/95/EU; 
 Documents [Bundestagsdrucksache] from the German Parliament [Bundesrat]11. 
While the court verdicts that I will be reviewing will cover the time period between 2004 – 
2015, the landmark decision from the Federal Administrative Court’s 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht] is from 1988 (hereafter referred to as 1988-Decision). A full list 
                                                          
10 For a compilation off all verdicts, please see the list of verdicts under bibliography. 
11 For a compilation off all parliament documents used, please see the list under bibliography. 
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of the court verdicts that form the empirical basis for this study is outlined in the 
bibliography. The reason for including the 1988-Decision in my archaeological approach 
can be found in the aspect that many of my empirical court decisions referred to the 1988-
Decision, since it is binding for administrative courts and political institutions. Although this 
seems like a long period for comparatively few verdicts, I was due to the former mentioned 
challenges not able to generate additional empirical material. Yet as outlined earlier, the 
repetitiveness of statements found in my empirical material denotes that these are sufficient 
for a discourse analysis. In addition, the enforcement of the Council Directive 2004/83/EU 
and its amended version Council Directive 2011/95/EU equally shows that the biggest 
amount of empirical data is from the last 3-4 years where the Council Directives have been 
fully enforced.  
These various empirical materials in conjunction with my analytical and methodical tools 
will hence provide an answer to my overall research questions. 
 
2.6.3 Ethical Considerations 
In this chapter, I will briefly reflect upon my own ethical behaviour concerning my selection 
of court verdicts as my main empirical material12. 
Ethical requirements to inform the affected parties or receiving their consent can be traced 
back to one of the guiding principles in line with the Swedish Research Council, which 
covers the aspect of “[d]o not conduct your research in a way that could harm other people 
(e.g. subjects)” (Gustavsson, Hermrén & Petersson 2005). While some of my selected court 
verdicts are available online, hence obtaining consents or the like is not applicable. The 
second part of my court verdicts were obtained through contact with one of the judges from 
the Berlin Administrative Courts. As earlier outlined, not all cases are published online, but 
in general all verdicts from the various courts are official affairs and hence upon request, and 
albeit with obstacles, these are available to the public. In order to protect the integrity of 
                                                          
12 The other part of my empirical material is made up of laws and parliament inquiries which are publicly 
available and hence there exists no risk in this study that could compromise the ‘do no harm’ principle. 
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those verdicts that were not officially anonymised, their integrity is still protected in this 
study, as I refrain from referring to any names or the like. Finally, with regards to knowledge 
derived from expert opinions, these are not discussed on any personal level or with citations 
as references in this study. The overall existence of such documents as background 
knowledge for legal decision-making is the only aspect that is discussed.  
Finally, by reflecting briefly on the other guidelines proposed by the Swedish Research 
Council regarding “to tell the truth about your research”, “openly report your methods and 
results”, affiliations with “commercial interests and ties”, plagiarism, fairness of other 
research and conducting research in an “orderly manner by maintaining documentation and 
retaining data” (Ibid.), I consider these as an important ethical base for this study. Lastly, 
although my methodological and theoretical stance rejects realist or positivist approaches to 
“truth”, my research is line with what the Swedish Research Council expresses as 
“demand[s] for integrity” expressing a critical stance towards my own generated data and 
about what my “data will demonstrate” (Ibid.: 16). 
 
3. ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, I will analyse the relationship between the sexual psychology and German 
legal decision-making that deal with the credibility assessment of refugee/asylum appeal 
cases relating to sexual orientation. Hereunder, I will explore by what kinds of knowledges, 
techniques and mechanisms law and legal decision-making achieve its ‘truth effects’ and 
how this knowledge is constituted in the governing of refugees from sexual minorities. In 
the first part of my analysis, I will investigate how knowledge stemming from the sexual 
psychology counts as relevant criteria and precondition for interpreting the law ‘membership 
of a particular social group’. Hereunder, I will focus especially on the discourse of an 
‘irreversible (homo)sexual orientation’ that have been the guiding reference point in 
contemporary appeal cases as well as in specific moments in German jurisprudence. The 
second part of my analysis, will focus on expert opinions and law as techniques/modes that 
objectify and thereby create specific criteria and categories as part of the credibility 
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assessment. Finally, the third part will examine how normalising mechanisms in legal 
decision-making operate and I will reflect upon the potential effects that the discourse of an 
‘irreversible homosexual disposition’ has on jurisprudence. 
 
3.1 The German Administrative Courts and Sexual Psychological Knowledge of the 
‘Particular social Group’ 
Taking point of departure in three different sets of empiria: my selected court verdicts dealing 
with asylum/refugee appeal cases relating to sexual orientation, the landmark decision by 
the Federal Administrative Court from 1988, as well as two different parliament [Bundesrat] 
documents from the 5th and 6th legislature period, I will do an archaeology of the local 
discursive formations, the political rational and the governing episteme, i.e. an accumulation 
of underlying scientific truths, that legitimises certain techniques for the governing of sexual 
minority refugees in contemporary German legal decision-making. In addition, I will 
provide an answer to my first working question: ‘What kind of knowledge counts as relevant 
criteria and precondition when interpreting the law on ‘membership of a particular social 
group’ as part of the credibility assessment in German legal decision-making?’. 
 
3.1.1 Credibility and the Discourse of an irreversible homosexual Orientation 
Although German legislation has changed from criminalisation of homosexuality to 
acknowledging rights for sexual minorities, including the right to asylum/refugee status, that 
rely on the liberal notion of self-identification, literature has yet pointed towards the notion 
of ‘sexual orientation’ in German legal decision-making still being determined and verified 
by sexual psychological experts (Markard 2013; Dolk & Schwantner 2007; Referat für 
gleichgeschlechtliche Lebensweisen 1994; BT-Drucks. 17/8228). In the following, I will 
therefore investigate to what extend the credibility assessment and the corresponding court 
verdicts entail direct or indirect traces of the sexual psychological science affecting German 
legal decision-making. 
34 
 
Firstly, I will however take point of departure in the legal framework of the German Asylum 
Act 1992 (see also Council Directives13, Article 10) in which I can observe a contradiction 
between two significant paragraphs that encompass the legal requirement ‘membership of a 
particular social group’. On one hand § 3b, Abstract 1 No. 4 stipulates that a “membership” 
with a “particular social group” is connected to “innate characteristic”, “a common 
background that cannot be changed”, “a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to 
identity or conscience” or “a distinct identity” (German Asylum Act 1992). On the other 
hand, § 3b, abstract 2 outlines that “it is immaterial whether the applicant actually possesses 
the “(…) social (…) characteristic which attracts the persecution, provided that such a 
characteristic is attributed to the applicant by the actor of persecution” (German Asylum Act 
1992). The legal framework does, as such, not define how judgement can be reached. As 
with all laws, interpretation relies on carefully weighing different indicators and evidences 
to reach conclusion. According to UNHCR, self-definition should be taken as an indicator 
of the individual’s sexual orientation and decision-making should rely on the person’s 
testimony alone (UNHCR 2008: 16). Yet as I will show in the following, when interpreting 
the Act in practice, the perceived causality between “innate characteristic”, “common 
background” or characteristic fundamental to identity” weighs more than the paragraph on 
“immateriality”14.  
When being granted the possibility for an oral proceeding15, the main source of evidence for 
the deciding judge in the credibility assessment of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation are the 
statements made from the applicants evolving around their personal narrative and 
persecution story. As a decision from the Federal Administrative Court outlines: “Credibility 
is defined by conclusive facts and truthful descriptions of a real event that is empirically 
                                                          
13 Until the Council Directive 2004/83/EU was enforced in 2004, asylum and refugee claimants from sexual 
minorities were not understood as part of a ‘particular social group’ in German asylum cases; instead, 
homosexuality was counted as relevant asylum-related characteristics. Currently its amended version ‘Council 
Directive 2011/95/EU’ is in force. 
14 For more information, see literature review. 
15 In connection with the enforcement of the first Dublin Regulation in 1997, the laws on ‘safe third country‘ 
and ‘safe country of origin‘ provide the legal instrument for implementing the Dublin Regulations and are 
enshrined in the German Basic Law, i.e. Germany’s Constitutions. Applications now are rejected as ‘manifestly 
unfounded’ [offensichtlich unbegründet], which changes also the judicial procedures extensively, minimising 
the possibility for oral proceedings. 
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defined through concreteness, a high level of details and presentiveness” (BVerwG, 
26.10.1989, 9 B 405.89). In addition, it remains fundamental that the narrative of the plaintiff 
is described in a way to presents itself as lived experience.  
Crosschecking this approach with my empirical material, I can observe that most court 
verdicts focused on the proving of whether the plaintiff indeed held the outlined 
characteristics and identity traits, instead of leaving this to self-definition of the plaintiff. 
This argument can be substantiated through the crystallising of a pattern that revolves around 
certain statements connected to the words ‘innate’, ‘irreversible’, ‘fateful’ [schicksalhaft], 
‘determined’, ‘disposition’, ‘substance’, ‘identity’. In addition, most of the material focused 
on homosexuality as the only indicator for being associated with ‘membership of a particular 
social group’. A verdict from the Administrative Court Ansbach from 2008 can serve as an 
example of the similarity of reoccurring statements in connection with the law on 
‘membership of a particular social group’: 
“Based on the claim of the plaintiff and his way of life it clearly can be established that 
there does not exist an irreversible fateful and immutable homosexual predisposition in 
him” (VG Ansbach 2008).16 
Instead of focusing on self-definition, I can observe through these kinds of statements that 
judges repeatedly question whether the plaintiff’s “substance/disposition” and identity 
“really” was ‘homosexual’. Further, “generic” statements concerning the sexual orientation 
were disqualified for not being sufficient, credible or conclusive for being categorised under 
the law on ‘membership of a particular social group’. However, it was not only when judges 
disqualified the plaintiffs’ narratives concerning their sexual orientation as “innate 
characteristic” that the statement of “irreversible” occurred, but these occurred equally when 
judges identified the plaintiff as being “irreversible homosexual”: 
“The court is in favour of the applicant on the assumption that an irreversible 
homosexual predisposition exists in her. According to the verdict of the Federal 
                                                          
16 See Appendix A, No. 1 for original German quotation. 
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Administrative Court, punishment of an irreversible, fateful homosexuality generally 
constitutes political persecution as laid down in Art. 16, paragraph 1 GG (…)“ (VG 
Bayreuth 2012).17 
Bridging therefore the aspect of sexual orientation being something that is innate and 
fundamental part of a human dispositions (psyche/identity) with the requirement that the 
sexual orientation should be an integral part of one’s life history, or at least something that 
denotes a high degree of lived experience, it is here where the relationship between the 
sexual psychology as a episteme and knowledge dimension in legal decision-making 
emerges. When reviewing my empiria, it became evident that the statements concerning an 
irreversible fateful homosexual orientation were reoccurring. Relating this terminology to 
current scientific stances of (sexual) psychology, these hold that a person’s sexuality is a 
fundamental feature/characteristic of a person’s psychological dispositions and identity 
structure (Müller Götzman 2009). While the law defines sexual orientation as “innate”, most 
of my reviewed empirical court verdicts mentioned “irreversibility”. The terminology of 
“irreversible homosexual disposition” are also actively used by the sexual psychologist as 
part of the expert opinions that were connected to the files of the reviewed administrative 
court of Berlin18. While in earlier years it was mandatory for asylum seekers and refugees 
from sexual minorities to provide (sexual) expert opinions, these are no longer required 
officially by the German authorities (BT-Drucks. 17/8357: 5; Rath 2014). However, if these 
are provided, expert opinions will be considered in the final judgement.  
To Foucault, the human sciences, e.g. psychiatry and psychology, made ‘sexuality’ and ‘sex’ 
the fundamental part in a person’s identity. The act of obtaining knowledge about the 
plaintiff’s sexual orientation becomes therefore synonymous with gaining access to this truth 
(Taylor 2009: 57). Hence, as a mean to obtain this knowledge and truth about the “innate 
characteristic(s)” and “characteristic(s) fundamental to identity”, and thereby overall 
question of whether the plaintiff belongs to the legal category of a ‘particular social group’, 
                                                          
17 See Appendix A, No. 2 for original German quotation. 
18 In addition, this argumentation will be developed further in the upcoming sub-chapter.   
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sexual psychology remains crucial evidence in German asylum/refugee appeal cases. By 
being able to examine and interpret the most inner secret of the plaintiff’s narrative, 
disciplinary power with the help of the sexual psychology is able to make hierarchical 
observations and normalising judgements, as well as establishes categories, criteria and 
preconditions that are connected to the interpretation of laws. Consequently, I can argue that 
the cases in question rely on sexual expert opinions to complement the “subjective” narrative 
with a perceived “objective” verification in order to substantiate what narratives are true and 
live experience or which ones are unsubstantiated and false.  
 
3.1.2 Irreversibility as scientific-political Rationale and legal Manifestation 
In the subsequent part, I will investigate the discursive events that gave rise to such particular 
knowledge, and how these scientific lines of reasoning firstly have become embedded into 
German legal decision-making. The aim of the following is therefore to trace back these 
specific types of truths and knowledges within two different sets of materials, namely in a 
landmark decision from the Federal Administrative Court [Bundesverwaltungsgericht] from 
1988 and German parliament [Bundesrat] documents from the 5th and 6th legislature period. 
 
3.1.2.1 The 1988 landmark Decision 
In many of the (un)published court decision I have observed that key references are being 
made to the 1988-Decision. These references mostly occurred in conjunction with statements 
concerning a plaintiff’s “irreversible”, “fateful” and “inescapable” [“unentrinnbar”] 
homosexual disposition. In addition, when reviewing the court files from the Administrative 
Court Berlin, and due to the binding character of the 1988-Decision, I also observe that the 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees [Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge] 
(hereafter referred to as BAMF) equally refers to the 1988-Decision. 
In the 1980’s, homosexuality was counted as relevant asylum-related characteristics granting 
political asylum under certain preconditions. This possibility was for the first time legally 
manifested in this 1988 landmark decision. With reference to and under explicit citation of 
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the “special treatment“ of homosexuals in German concentration camps in the Third Reich, 
the 1988-Decision enabled homosexual refugees/asylum seekers to obtain political asylum. 
Due to its binding character, decisions from the Federal Administrative Courts act in a law-
like manner but still require interpretation (BVerwG 1988). Despite this progressive 
approach, this ruling occurred at a time where §175 of the German Penal Code still was in 
charge, criminalizing certain kinds of male homosexual activities between the age of 18-21. 
In this landmark decision from 1988, the Federal Administrative Court concluded and 
loosely translated as: 
“This is not a matter of mere tendency [bloße Neigung], which is the plaintiff can more 
or less refrain from, but that there exist an irreversible, unescapable and fateful 
homosexual disposition, which determines the plaintiff’s emotional life and sexual 
behaviour since the 15. or 16. year of age” (BVerwG 1988).19 
This decision clearly defines the possibilities for who can obtain political asylum and which 
criteria need to be fulfilled. As the quote outlines, it is not sufficient that a person’s 
homosexuality is only a mere tendency [bloße Neigung] but instead it understands a person’s 
sexual orientation as a stable part of identity and behaviour, which even has been determined 
since adolescents (Ibid). Further, the decision stated that the plaintiff’s narrative was 
conclusive, since it covered the knowledge provided by sexual-scientific and 
psychoanalytical expert opinions as part of the oral proceeding in the Federal Administrative 
Court (Ibid). Hence, it can be argued in line with the 1988-Decision that a statement of appeal 
is conclusive and a person’s sexual orientation is perceived as credible, if it covers sexual 
scientific knowledge and is verified by a sexual psychologist as expert. Further, by rejecting 
the former held positivistic-sexual scientific “(…) thesis of a free determinability of sexual 
drive direction”20 or rather the former held moral idea that homosexuality can be the product 
of socialisation or seduction (BVerwG 1988), I argue that the landmark decision can be 
understood as an important discursive event in German legal decision-making that 
                                                          
19 See Appendix A, No. 3 for original German quotation. 
20 See Appendix A, No. 4 for original German quotation. 
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manifested the sexual psychological science as guiding episteme in legal decision-makings. 
Consequently, the discourse of an ‘irreversible fateful homosexual disposition’ was thereby 
manifested in relation to asylum-relevant characteristics. 
The inclusion of, amongst others, sexual psychologists as expert knowledge in legal 
decision-making hands to the judiciary a certain power of truth, since it is perceived as an 
“objective” science that defines and preconditions specific characteristics, categories and 
identity traits, which decision-makers can use to interpret the plaintiff’s narrative and the 
German asylum law. Examples of such criteria and categories can be highlighted through 
the scientific assumption that ‘there exist a certain time in life where a person’s 
(homo)sexual orientation has become fixed’ after which this (homo)sexual orientation then 
is understood as “irreversible, fateful and inescapably” and not a mere tendency. On the 
contrary, this 1988-Decision hands over to the sexual psychology a ‘unitary field of objects’, 
which secures the need for expert examinations and opinions. Scientific knowledge counts 
as objective and reliable evidence contrary to the subjective narrative that the plaintiff is 
providing. Operating on a continuum between “normal” and the “abnormal”, sexual 
psychology seeks to classify, categorise, as well as to normalise the object of governance. 
This can especially be emphasised due to the statement of “fateful” as this could be 
interpreted as being something that denotes an abnormal state, which however cannot be 
changed. As the statements of irreversibility were reoccurring in contemporary cases, I argue 
that the discourse of an “irreversible homosexual disposition” is dominant as it determines 
in a given historical epoch in German legal decision-making what is being accepted as 
meaningful and true and thereby legitimises certain legal practices.  
 
3.1.2.2 Parliament Documents from the 5th and 6th legislative Period 
The following part will continue to trace back further discursive events that point towards 
the discourse of ‘irreversible homosexual disposition’ derived from the human sciences, i.e. 
(sexual) psychology, which can be understood as the guiding episteme in legal decision-
making. Thereby, I would like to emphasise how this scientific lines of reasoning firstly have 
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become embedded into political rationalities, where after this scientific-political rational of 
an irreversible (homo)sexual orientation has become manifested in legal decision-making. 
In the 1988-Decision, the Federal Administrative Court refers to two document 
[Bundestagsdrucksache] by the German parliament [Bundesrat]21 from the 5th and 6th 
legislative period (BT-Drucks. 5/4094; BT-Drucks. 6/3521). Within these two parliament 
documents, the penal code §175 (criminalisation of male homosexual activities between the 
age of 18 and 21) is discussed, amongst other laws.  
In the parliament document from the 5th legislature period, it was stated that those men who 
practice same same-sex relationships, show an irreversible disposition [Prägung] (BT-
Drucks. 5/4094). Further, it was stated that “(…) also what applies in this regard, the 
manifestations of same-sex exercise should not emanate any advertising effects on normal 
sentient human beings”22 (BT-Drucks. 5/4094). By this statement, a distinction between 
„normal“ heterosexual persons and „abnormal“ homosexual persons whose sexuality has 
been criminalised through §175 of the German Penal Code becomes evident. In addition and 
more interestingly, this statement equally shows a paradigm shift towards the earlier outlined 
stance that homosexuality is “irreversible” or as contemporarily expressed “innate” and as 
such lays political ground for the decriminalisation of same-sex relationships amongst men. 
Another component can be outlined through the document from the 6th legislative period, 
which discusses the age of homosexual consent between young men (BT-Drucks. 6/3521). 
In this, it is emphasised that according the then state of the art, it is scientifically 
acknowledged that the sexual orientation of a young man is fully determined by the end of 
adolescences (BT-Drucks. 6/3521: 30): 
“According to this expert opinion [Gutachten], a very large proportion of the male 
youths have encountered (hetero)sexual experiences when they reach the age of 
eighteen, which act immunizing against homosexual influences. Also the psychological 
                                                          
21 The German representative bodies is comprised of a bicameral institution, namely the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat, which pass legislation and also elect its de facto head of state. 
22 See Appendix A, No. 5 for original German quotation. 
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maturity at the age of eighteen has been developed to the extent that they largely are 
able to act independent and self-responsible” (BT-Drucks. 6/3521: 30).23 
This statement shows that sexual scientists, psychologists and pedagogues validate that a 
young man’s sexual drive cannot be reversed by the end of 18, it even “acts immunizing”, 
making therefore a reshaping [Umprägung] to homosexuality no longer possible (BT-
Drucks. 6/3521: 30). Further, the discussion amongst German politicians regarding the penal 
code §175 outlines a shift away from an earlier positivist sexual scientific stance holding 
that homosexuality is a matter of behaviour, “seduction” or choice, towards a sexual 
psychology describing homosexuality as a matter of disposition and identity with innate and 
irreversible characteristics (BT-Drucks. 6/3521; BVerwG 1988). In addition, laying the 
scientific basis for the assumption that a person’s sexual orientation is developed fully by 
the end of adolescent, this scientific knowledge has potential objectifying consequences for 
those individuals who do not “hold” a fixed and stable sexual orientation by that age. Hence, 
it is here that we find the connection to the discourse of an ‘irreversible homosexuality’ and 
the effects of sexual psychology as episteme for both the political rational and judiciary. 
Thus, the analysis of epistemes are crucial in an archaeology, since an episteme entails the 
discursive regularities of the sciences, denoting an epistemological field that gives rise to 
and legitimises certain practices.  
 
3.1.3 Sexual psychological Expert Opinions and the Verification of an ‘irreversible’ 
Homosexuality 
I will now investigate and categorise what kind of roles expert opinions as valid knowledge 
play in contemporary asylum cases relating to sexual orientation. 
Besides observing in my empiria a direct reference to scientific examinations, i.e. as expert 
opinions [Gutachten] or expert witness statements referred to in the court verdicts, I also 
found expert opinions as separate documents within the case files of the Berlin 
                                                          
23 See Appendix A, No. 6 for original German quotation. 
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Administrative Court Berlin that were not referred to in the final verdicts. These will not be 
examined here, but it is however important to outline that these are substantial part of court 
cases dealing with sexual orientation and asylum/refugee status.  Examining the direct 
statements outlined in the courts’ verdicts, another from 2008 by the Administrative Court 
Wiesbaden entailed a written expert opinion, which was used as supporting evidence for the 
classification of a plaintiff’s alleged irreversible homosexuality: 
“The claimant explained in his interview at the Federal Office that he first had 
homosexual contacts during his military service. (…) The court does not doubt these 
statements, particularly as the claimant made identical statements when questioned by 
the clinical centre of the university of (…) and the sexological-psychological expert 
opinion concludes that the claimant has an irreversible homosexual disposition” (VG 
Wiesbaden 2008)24. 
Here, the aspect of plausibility does not only occur through repetition of the narrative, but 
through the detailed examination by the sexological-psychological expert who diagnoses 
and categorises the plaintiff’s homosexuality as being irreversible. By actively classifying 
the plaintiff and proposing categories of sexual identity traits and behaviour, the plaintiff is 
turned into an object. Modes of objectification in conjunction with modes of subjectification 
function in “Western” societies to turn human beings into subjects. This reciprocal relation 
between law/legal decision-making and the sexual psychology together enable the governing 
plaintiffs through certain techniques and knowledges. 
Until recent years, the BAMF officially required expert opinions when dealing with asylum 
cases relating to sexual orientation. According to a parliament enquiry from 2012, the 
German government states that the BAMF no longer requires an expert opinion from asylum 
seekers that apply on grounds of their sexual orientation (BT-Drucks. 17/8357). The 
practices of the Administrative Courts it is not known exactly, but currently, most plaintiffs 
provide expert opinions or expert witness statements “voluntarily” and use them as 
supporting evidence for the existence of their sexual orientation. Although not being 
                                                          
24 See Appendix A, No. 7 for original German quotation. 
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mandatory, when these are submitted, these will equally be taken into consideration in the 
judgements of the German authorities (Schmidt 2013).  
In my empiria, it is observable that judges rely on expert opinions as part of the credibility 
assessment, which acts as guiding knowledge for interpreting the law on ‘membership of a 
particular social group’. As the following statement shows, non-provision of such expert 
opinion might decrease the changes in the assessment: 
“Insofar as presented in the statement of claim that the expert opinion [Gutachten] 
discovered the existence of an irreversible homosexuality in the claimant, this is 
incomprehensible. Because obviously, such an expert opinion is not yet created [and] 
such [was] neither submitted to the court (…)” (VG Berlin 2009).25 
Court verdicts are always used by different legal actors and hence an argumentation like this 
can have potential effects for future cases as it establishes some sort of causality between the 
existence of a person’s sexual orientation and the need for expert opinions to verify this 
claims. Although expert opinions no longer officially are required, this citation shows that 
the former practices have made expert opinions part of jurisprudence as these knowledges 
count as highly important truths in the German credibility assessment. Consequently, 
psychological expert examination of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation not only feed decision-
makers with knowledge, categories, characteristics and truths that counts as relevant for the 
law ‘membership of a particular social group’, but also becomes a necessary technique to 
objectify and normalise the discourse of an “irreversible homosexual disposition” in German 
jurisprudence. Hence, as I will show later, this ultimately will have governing effects for 
refugees/asylum seekers from sexual minorities who seek protection in Germany. 
Having already earlier outlined through the 1988-Decision and the parliament documents 
the state of the art of sexual scientific knowledge and their understandings of how a 
(homo)sexual disposition should develop, I observed that much of the credibility assessment 
circulates around whether the claimant truly holds a (homo)sexual orientation. Many sexual 
                                                          
25 See Appendix A, No. 8 for original German quotation. 
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minority refugee claimants also underline this in their narrative the relation to the knowledge 
about being “different” than the others by a certain age. A verdict by the Administrative 
Court Ansbach from 2008 entailed a statement concerning this connection between 
“irreversibility” and “adolescence” and was also related to the claimant’s bisexuality: 
“The plaintiff lacks, according to the chamber, an identity-forming disposition 
[Identitätsprägung] in this sense, because due to his own assertion his homosexuality 
was by the end of his adolescence, a point in time where according to current state of 
knowledge [Wissenschaftsstand] a fateful determination of homosexuality exists, not 
more than a mere tendency besides his lived heterosexuality” (VG Ansbach 2008).26 
In German legal decision-making, it seems therefore that the criteria of a credible sexual 
orientation are understood in close connection to a certain time span when this orientation 
has become “visible” or “manifested” in the plaintiff. Also in this citation the perceived 
causality between ‘(homo)sexuality’ and ‘identity’ is being outlined as a criterion for 
credibility. Another verdict from the Administrative Court Düsseldorf from 2012, 
emphasises that “irreversibility” should according to current understandings not be the main 
concern, but on the contrary it still outlines the incredibility of the claimant’s sexual 
orientation by reference to the claimant’s age: „Even the story of how the plaintiffs[’s] 
[homosexuality] came about, that he in the year of 2002 with more than 40 years discovered 
his same-sex orientation, does not convince. “(VG Düsseldorf 2012).27  
With these statement in mind, I argue therefore that the sexual psychology as well as German 
jurisprudence understands adolescents and sexuality as being fully developed and becomes 
static by a certain age, as well as makes sexual orientation a fundamental part of a person’s 
identity. However, as these are by no means universal “concepts”, it seems that this 
“knowledge” derived from “Western” scientist clashes with those experiences that asylum 
seekers and refugee from non-Western areas have. The idea of a fixed and static sexual 
orientation, or in general what “Western” people might understand as such, becomes even 
                                                          
26 See Appendix A, No. 9 for original German quotation. 
27 See Appendix A, No. 10 for original German quotation. 
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more differentiated for those individuals who were forced to hide their sexual orientation in 
the country of origin. Further, this is an indicator for how the sexual psychology has come 
to play a major influence on law and legal jurisprudence. By creating the idea of what a 
normal sexual development should supposed to be like, it simultaneously pathologies those 
traits and criteria connected to sexual orientation that are not understood as “irreversible” or 
are contrary to these truths (e.g. about age and stability) and assumptions that reproduce the 
knowledges that sexual orientation with these characteristics is a normal and universal 
phenomenon.  
 
3.1.4 Summary first Part 
As this chapter has shown, there exist a reciprocal relationship between the law/judiciary 
and the disciplinary power on this topic, since their relationship has been manifested through 
the discussion of the §175, the 1988-Decision and is reproduced in current court verdicts 
through expert opinions. The discourse of an ‘irreversible (homo)sexual disposition’ can be 
traced throughout the empirical material and is further reproduced by expert opinions that 
continue to categorise the plaintiffs as holding an “irreversible” and “fateful” homosexual 
dispositions. So far, the existence of a sexual psychological episteme, i.e. an accumulation 
of underlying scientific truths, has crystallised through a reoccurring pattern of specific 
statements within my empirical cases that I was reviewing. Due to the analysis of the more 
“hidden” references, namely the two documents from the Bundesrat combined with the 
1988-Decision, in my empirical cases, these make visible the political rational and scientific 
truths as episteme that also inform today’s German legal decision-making when dealing with 
asylum/refugee appeal cases relating to sexual orientation.  As the concept of ‘irreversibility’ 
clearly stems from the sexual psychology, sexual psychologists remain an important source 
of knowledge for the judiciary that supports the latter in classifying the plaintiff as belonging 
to the law on ‘membership of a particular social group’. Through the knowledge and criteria 
of ‘age by which a sexual orientation fully has developed’ and ‘overall static perspective of 
sexuality and identity’ provided by the sexual psychological science, German legal decision-
makers can value whether the plaintiff’s narrative is “credible”. Simultaneously, this 
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knowledge and truths pathologies those traits and criteria connected to sexual orientation 
that are not understood as “irreversible”. The credibility assessment hence relies on a sexual 
psychological diagnosis (expert opinions) of the plaintiff’s sexuality, which verifies the 
existence and truthfulness of that person’s sexual orientation. Operating on a continuum 
between “normal” and the “abnormal”, sexual psychology seeks to classify, categorise, as 
well as to normalise the object of governance. 
 
3.2 Modes of Objectification and Expert Opinions in German Administrative Courts 
Having earlier analysed the governing episteme, I will in the following focus on the German 
administrative courts techniques that inhibit certain modes of objectification, such as expert 
opinions and laws, to categorise and define valid and invalid sexual orientations under the 
law ‘membership of a particular social group’. Applied together in legal decision-making, 
these kinds of modes of objectification enable the former analysed discourse of an 
‘irreversible (homo)sexual disposition’ and sexual psychological episteme to be made 
‘operable’. In this chapter, I will also provide an answer to my second working questions: 
‘What kind of modes of objectification as techniques are present in the German legal 
decision-making when dealing with asylum/refugee appeals cases relating to sexual 
orientation and how do these operate?’. 
 
3.2.1 Scientific Expert Opinions as Mode of Objectification 
While the former part focused more on the epistemic dimension, specially how scientific 
lines of reasoning became embedded into juridical lines of decision-making, this part will 
outline the more technical side that operationalise the knowledge and truths outlined earlier. 
Here I will focus especially on those modes of objectification or totalising techniques (expert 
opinions and law) that are operating within the credibility assessment. In addition, I will 
briefly discuss the components ‘expert opinion within court files’ and ‘expert opinions 
mentioned in court verdicts’, which can be seen as an archive that can be of objectifying 
character.  
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Scientific expert opinions as a mode acquires objectification through classifications and 
categorisations, and provides the law on ‘membership of a particular social group’ to “(…) 
function on a general horizon of truth” (Foucault in Golder & Fitzpatrick 2009: 66). As the 
credibility assessment seeks to obtain the “truth” in asylum seekers and refugees narratives, 
it seems that this can only be done by examining and generating knowledge about the 
plaintiff’s lived sexuality. Thus specifications, preconditions and categories that are used as 
evidence for the interpretation of the legal framework of a ‘membership of a particular social 
group’ creates normative parameters of what an innate/irreversible sexual orientation is 
supposed to be.  
However, these normative criteria and aspects are created by the disciplinary power through 
sexual psychology so that plaintiffs can be objectified and classified in relation to the guiding 
knowledge that defines sexual orientation as an identity-forming disposition. Thereby, 
categories and classification seek to qualify, correct and regulate those individuals who have 
not yet been determined by the discourse of an ‘irreversible (homo)sexual disposition’. As a 
precondition, it establishes the time when a sexual orientation fully has been determined and 
become “irreversible” and also classifies which sexual orientation is relevant for the 
credibility.  
Even though the individual plaintiff is being examined by the sexual psychologist, and 
thereby is targeted on her/his subjectivity, the application of categories and concepts are 
overall not taking into consideration the individual plaintiff’s own narratives. To my 
knowledge, no sexual psychologist/psychiatrist has delivered an expert opinion not verifying 
the existence of an irreversible homosexual orientation, but all have been verified as being 
‘irreversible homosexual’. This certain kinds of knowledges and truths and the need of 
verifying a plaintiff’s sexual orientation, can be traced back to the 1988-Decision and the 
scientific-political rational that discursively manifested the approach of an ”(…) irreversible 
disposition of an unescapable fateful” homosexuality (BverwG 1988). 
Through framing of the law on ‘membership of a particular social group’, the sexual 
psychology gains its ‘unitary field of objects’, since the legal preconditions define that this 
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group “(…) is perceived as being different by the surrounding society” (German Asylum Act 
1992). This can both be observed by differentiating between the “normal” heterosexual and 
the “abnormal” homosexual individual, since the credibility assessment (in)voluntarily 
requires pathologisation after which the plaintiff can be diagnosed and classified as 
“irreversible homosexual”. This in return has both objectifying and normalising effects on 
the individual. The sexual psychology inside the legal system thereby contributes to a 
normalisation through abnormalisation, an analytical component derived from Foucault 
(Foucault 2003: xxii).  
Expert opinions can either be observed as evidence within the court files or mentioned 
directly in the court verdicts. Expert opinions, as separate documents within court verdicts, 
can act as background knowledge to promote “natural” and “unitary” norms/stereotypes and 
categories about this ‘particular social group’ within the wider juridical profession. The 
expert knowledge provided by the sexual psychologist – determining who can be classified 
as part of the law on ‘membership of a particular social group’ – enables that certain kinds 
of truths can become “fixed” in time through its written material. The earlier identified 
criteria of ‘age by which a sexual orientation fully has developed’ and ‘overall static 
perspective of sexuality and identity’ becomes through the reproduction in new court 
verdicts the dominant and natural stance to assess whether a sexual orientation is irreversible 
and hence credible. By establishing parameters and criteria for who can be recognised as 
part of the ‘particular social group’ classification, these categorise and concepts become 
naturalised and thus have objectifying effects on future cases to come. By naturalisation, I 
understand the way in which the discourse of an ‘irreversible homosexual disposition’ has 
become the only credible characteristic that is qualified for the membership of a particular 
social group. As outlined earlier this can be further substantiated by the aspect that German 
jurisprudence also today uses this concept in a normal manner, although stemming from a 
different time, instead of using the terminology of “innate” as the law outlines.  
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3.2.2 Law and legal Decision-Making as a Mode of Objectification 
In this part, I will briefly depict how the law on ‘membership of a particular social group’ in 
conjunction with legal decision-making can be understood as a mode objectification creating 
legal categories from which it is possible to govern. This denotes a process that divides the 
individual asylum seeker from others, exclusively due to the sexual orientations, and turns 
the former into an object of governance on the basis of categories. In line with Foucault’s 
analytical approach, it becomes necessary to outline this dimension as law thereby frames 
sexual scientific knowledges, including its categories and criteria, and proposes these as 
valid truths to decision-makers and plaintiffs. 
Initially, law and legal decision-making can operate through a mode of power that is 
associated as sovereign, as well as disciplinary (Golder & Fitzpatrick 2009). Both sides are 
always at work in modern Western societies. When German alien and asylums laws are 
understood in its sovereign manner, then the single individual does not have any influence 
in legal decision-making. Overall, the plaintiff is made an object of administrative practices 
and no weights is given to the individual narratives and circumstances. This goes contrary 
to what UNHC stresses: “Due to their often complex nature, claims relating to sexual 
orientation are generally unsuited to accelerated processing or the application of “safe 
country or origin” concepts” (UNHCR 2012:14). Instead the plaintiff is solely understood 
through an overall principle of categorisation. In Germany, the laws on ‘safe third country’ 
as part of the Dublin Regulations and the law on ‘safe country of origin’ thereby often 
exclude the possibility or appealing for an oral process at the administrative courts. From a 
bureaucratic perspective law needs to be framed in a way that enables the governing of a 
total population instead of each single individual – It is here, where the productive side of 
law appears. 
When law and legal decision-making on the contrary are more understood from it productive 
and disciplining side, law is operating as a dividing technique – it divides between 
normal/abnormal, sane/mad, good/bad etc. – after which it can have normalising effects for 
the individual and wider society (Golder & Fitzpatrick 2009; Foucault 2014). This especially 
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occurs when law and legal decision-making works in relation with other powers/professions, 
such as in my chosen case with the sexual psychological science.  
The law on ‘membership of a particular social group’, which is stipulated in § 3b, Abstract 
1 No. 4 of the German Asylum Act [Asylgesetz] 1992, seeks to divide the “normal” 
heterosexual refugee or asylum seeker from the other “members” of sexual minorities are 
perceived as “different” (German Asylum Act 1992). Overall, it can be argued in line with 
Hardy (2003) that the concept/category of a ‘refugee’ equally be understood as a mode of 
objectification, since: 
“[t]he refugee subject is a product of the processes of determination that lead to his or 
her classiﬁcation as well as the broader discourses that impinge on and overlap with 
refugee discourse. (…) There is, then, no autonomous subject: a refugee only exists 
insofar as he or she is named and recognized by others” (Hardy 2003:467/477). 
Apart from the overall classification of being a “refugee/asylum seeker”, the object of my 
study is in this context categorised in a double-way, becoming the “lesbian/gay” refugee. As 
already shown, this categorisation requires sexual psychological verification. Consequently, 
the actions of the dividing practices rely on and are justified “through the mediation of 
science (or pseudoscience) and the power the social group gives to scientific claims” 
(Madigan 1992:266-67).  
As the law on ‘membership of a particular social group’ promotes the right to asylum or 
refugee status due to an individual’s sexual orientation, judges hence need the expertise of 
sexual psychologist to interpret and classify to what extend the claimed sexual orientation is 
an innate/irreversible characteristic of the plaintiff’s identity and substance. Law as such 
needs to rely on the human sciences in order to “(…) function on a general horizon of ‘truth’” 
(Foucault cited in Golder & Fitzpatrick 2009: 66), since scientific categories and criteria 
appear under the cloak of an “objective” science which examines, diagnoses, categorises, 
classifies human beings and their behaviour, as well as creates statistics that distribute 
individuals on a continuum from normal to abnormal. In short, the objectifying mechanisms 
of the human science, such as sexual psychology, help to make law operational and 
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justifiable (Golder & Fitzpatrick 2009:84). Thereby, law is always subject to and applied by 
political powers/interests that enable the governing of society through scientific-legal 
categories and norms. By legally categorising those people and labelling them as a singular 
epistemological category, the law ‘membership of a particular social group’ sets the frame 
which requires the sexual psychology to act as experts that can reveal these truths. Further it 
creates the potential for governing those objectified individuals. In addition, by establishing 
a legal category covering the aspect that this group has a “distinct” identity in the relevant 
country, it sets the basis for pathologising processes which divides between the “normal” 
refugee/asylum seeker and the “abnormal” refugee/asylum seeker. 
 
3.2.3 Summary second Part 
In this chapter, I have tried to outline what kinds of techniques as modes of objectifications 
are present in legal decision-making, how these operate and how these become important 
productive functions in complementing the episteme upon which law relies. By separating 
analytically, the techniques from the knowledge dimension in legal decision-making, I have 
been able to show that the totalising techniques are necessary modes of objectification that 
make sexual psychological knowledge operational. Thus specifications, preconditions and 
categories that are used as evidence for the interpretation of the legal framework creates 
normative parameters of what an innate/irreversible sexual orientation is supposed to be. 
These criteria have been earlier identified as ‘age by which a sexual orientation fully has 
developed’ and ‘overall static perspective of sexuality and identity’. By reproducing these 
criteria and truths in new court verdicts, the discourse of an ‘irreversible (homo)sexual 
orientation’ becomes dominant and only narrative that is understood as valid and truth. 
Further, these truths become natural guiding knowledge for the law ‘membership of a 
particular social group’. This legal framework on a particular and coherent group with an 
innate characteristics and identity traits frames the need for sexual psychologist to act as 
expertise within this process. Finally, by categorising these individuals as holding a 
“distinct” identity in the relevant country, it sets the basis for and manifests the pathologising 
processes which divides between the “normal” refugee/asylum seeker and the “abnormal” 
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refugee/asylum seeker. 
 
3.3. Mechanisms of Normalisation: Governing sexual Minorities through Stereotypes 
In the subsequent part, I will direct my focus towards those normalising mechanisms in the 
credibility assessment that potentially allow for the governing of sexual minority refugees at 
a distance. I will exemplify this by focusing on two kinds of sexual stereotypes, namely 
‘bisexuality’ and ‘sexual minorities as coherent social group’, that I could identify in my 
empirical material. These stereotypes are similar to those that scholars within my literature 
review also have identified (see e.g. Markard 2013; Jansen & Spijkerboer 2011; Budd 2009, 
etc.). In practice, these stereotypes are mostly intertwined, but for analytical reasons, I will 
outline them as separate aspects. Finally, I will provide an answer to my third working 
question: ‘Which mechanisms are present in German legal decision-making when dealing 
with asylum/refugee appeals cases relating to sexual orientation and how do these operate?’. 
Law operates both through categories that apply to larger groups in society, as well as have 
an impact on the individual. Law is therefore dependent on other powers/knowledges and 
mechanisms, such as stereotypes and norms, for its individualising and normalising effects. 
On the other hand, sexual psychological expert knowledge can assist in the normalising 
dimension in legal decision-making by making certain kinds of knowledges dominant and 
make them appear as “natural”. This is often done through statistics, but in legal decision-
making certain dominant discourses, such as in this case the sexual scientific discourse of an 
“irreversible homosexual disposition”, is being reproduced and manifested through “cases 
laws” and statutes”. When a discourse becomes jurisprudence, it has potential normalising 
effects on the legal profession and future plaintiff. Thereby, jurisprudence can distribute 
certain comparative measures or political standards about sexuality and sexual identities 
apart from being framed as law. In extension, these can regulate what becomes normal 
behaviour and commons sense knowledge for the individual outside the legal scope. 
However, although stereotypes and norms originate according to Foucault from the human 
sciences, these can have developed to the extent that their “origin” no longer certainly can 
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be verified. As such, the sexual stereotypes in my empiria are on the threshold between 
scientific knowledge and stereotypes that have a Lebensraum [living space/environment]. 
However, the subsequent stereotypes can be traced back to the dominant. 
 
3.3.1 ‘Bisexuality’ 
A commonly held sexual stereotype that became visible in my empiria is the idea that people 
cannot be homosexual if they had former/present heterosexual relationships/marriages and 
children: 
“The Federal Agency [BAMF] has correctly valued this submission as totally 
incredible. Against the plausibility of the information speaks that the claimant in the 
meantime has a heterosexual relationship and intends to marry this woman and an 
irreversible homosexual disposition does not exist, despite that, the claimant in his 
interview at the Federal Office has alleged this and has not declared that he is bisexually 
predispositioned” (VG Berlin2009 (unpubl.)).28 
As I have outlined earlier, the 1988-Decision is not only binding for German administrative 
courts, but also in binding for the BAMF. The dominant discourse of an “irreversible 
(homo)sexual orientation” has therefore also gained political impact in different institutions. 
Aligning to Valverde’s line of thinking, it might not be classification that is problematic as 
such, but “what is problematic” in the German credibility assessment “are the historical 
inequalities” that it reproduces (Valverde 2003: 99). Thereby, all those sexualities and sexual 
expression that are not perceived as fixed and static become excluded from being understood 
as credible, lowering the changes for asylum/refugee status on these grounds.  
“The plaintiff would, due to his disposition, be able to have a relationship in Algeria 
with a woman and to live out his sexuality. This assumption is supported by the fact, 
that the plaintiff already has become a father to a child” (VG Saarland 2015: 11-12).29 
                                                          
28 See Appendix A, No. 12 for original German quotation. 
29 See Appendix A, No. 13 for original German quotation. 
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It can be argued on the basis of these observations, that bisexuality here is understood as 
“reversible” and a matter of “choice”. Through different court verdicts, this approach has 
become normalised and hence has become a natural stance in jurisprudence. In addition, it 
brings with it (post-colonial) effects, as the dominant “Western” perception holds certain 
standards and criteria for how sexual behaviour and sexual identity should develop and 
manifest itself. Those who do not fit into these categories or tell any other narrative than 
expected are thereby excluded. This argument can be extended with reference to a verdict 
from the Administrative Court of Ansbach stating that: 
“On suspension that the fact, that he obviously also had sexual intercourse with a 
woman meant that his homosexuality is not explicitly and irreversible, the plaintiff 
stated that this is correct, but he tends [neige] more towards men. When asked if he 
currently practices homosexual sex, the claimant stated, not here, but most recently in 
the Netherlands” (VG Ansbach.2008).30 
Stereotypes thereby can become a shared reference point for legal decision-makers and the 
wider population, including new potential plaintiffs. Hence, sexual stereotypes may not only 
sustain ideas about what is normal and abnormal, but also specifically proliferate and cement 
what is “a “natural” and necessary foundation upon which individual sexualities and 
subjectivities are based” (Taylor 2009:57). When something becomes normalised and part 
of jurisprudence, this restricts the plaintiffs’ of telling any other narrative than those which 
fit the discourse of an “irreversible (homo)sexual disposition”.  
 
3.3.2 Sexual Minorities as ‘a coherent social Group’ 
The second identified stereotype entails the idea that plaintiffs are understood as a ‘coherent 
social group’31: A sexual-subcultural stereotype. This overall stereotype revolves around a 
cluster of stereotypes concerning “assumed knowledge”, public manifestations (e.g. spaces), 
                                                          
30 See Appendix A, No. 14 for original German quotation. 
31It is difficult to assess whether these are these stereotypes are the exceptions, but if already found in my small 
amount of empirical material at hand, it cannot be excluded that there exist more (un)published verdicts 
entailing similar kinds of statements concerning this stereotypes. 
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patterns of behaviour and demeanour; which directs judges towards the real “truths” in the 
plaintiff’s narrative. In an unpublished verdict from the Administrative Court Berlin (2014), 
a judge declares: 
“In the written request for asylum through his legal representative, there exist only the 
generic reference to the claimant’s homosexuality, but no concrete specification to the 
outing or engagement in gay-lesbian associations” (VG Berlin 2014 (unpubl.)).32 
In addition to the engagement in gay-lesbian organisation, it is equally assumed that sexual 
minority refugees share an interest in public manifestation (e.g. spaces) that represent “their” 
sexuality. While the law on ‘a particular social group’ promotes the idea that individuals 
holding a certain sexuality are categorised as ‘members’ who even hold a “distinct identity”, 
I argue that this perceived causality would never have been postulated about heterosexual 
people. Thereby, these scientific-legal classifications enable and reiterate hierarchical and 
marginalising norms and stereotypes.  
Finally, stereotypes based on demeanour are difficult to capture, as these are impressions 
that judges acquire in oral proceedings and are rarely translated into the written verdict. 
However, what kind of categorisation occurs when these are translated into the final court 
verdicts, can be shown by the following empirical example: 
“The plaintiff has through her masculine appearance and the lively description of her 
identity with the resulting problems and dangers in Iran made plausible that she belongs 
to a [‘particular social’] group (…). Her homosexual orientation (…) is fateful 
[schicksalhafter] component of her entire personality (…)” (VG Stuttgart 2006).33 
This kind of statement is on the edge between Foucault’s understanding of disciplinary 
power’s normative evaluations about identity and behaviour and a bio-political discourses 
focusing on bodily appearances and bodily performances. In order to exemplify the switch 
from categorising “internal” characteristics to categorisation on bodily features and bodily 
                                                          
32 See Appendix A, No. 15 for original German quotation. 
33 See Appendix A, No. 16 for original German quotation. 
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performance, the subsequent older statement outlines what consequences stereotyping can 
have for legal decision-making and jurisprudence: 
“(…) if the sexual disposition does not remain hidden, but – as in the case of the plaintiff 
– becomes apparent. After the impression that the court has gained, the plaintiff cannot 
hide his sexual orientation. It [the sexual orientation] does not appear in an intrusive 
presentation [Aufmachung] (…), but in his defining body appearance and his body 
language that he cannot disguise. The court has gained sustainably this impression 
through the oral proceedings” (VG Düsseldorf 2004).34 
This approach in legal decision-making might be valued with carefulness, as this excludes a 
whole range of individuals who do not appear in certain expected ways and in accordance 
with the outlined sexual stereotypes. Further, this kind of approach has potential effects on 
how a “homosexual” person should appear, behave and perform their sexuality. Hence, 
severe potential consequences for such an approach in jurisprudence could be that not only 
are scientist used for the deciphering and extraction of internal hidden truth, but it can also 
bring with it physical measurements and classifications. For now, the performative 
requirements manifested through sexual orientation seems to be still prevailing in the 
credibility assessment and can contribute as a judge’s intuitive knowledge of who belongs 
to this ‘particular social group’. On the other hand, if stereotypes about certain sexual or 
subcultural expectation can be fulfilled, this increases the chances for being perceived as 
credible (Markard 2013:83-84). It can therefore not be excluded that plaintiffs govern 
themselves to the extent that such stereotypes become mechanisms of inscription, either just 
for the sake of being perceived as credible within the oral proceedings or also in terms of 
identity formations in the long run. 
 
                                                          
34 See Appendix A, No. 17 for original German quotation. 
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3.3.3 Stereotypes as normalising Mechanisms and potential naturalising Effects of 
German Jurisprudence 
This final chapter will briefly reflect on some additional aspects that are connected to the 
normalising effects that the discourse “irreversible (homo)sexual disposition” can have for 
categorisation and legal decision-making. Here, I will focus on two aspects: ‘expert opinions 
and “voluntary involuntariness”’ and ‘stereotypes and legal certainty’. 
The first point that I briefly would like to reflect on expert opinions and “voluntary 
involuntariness”. While analysing my court verdicts, I started to wonder about the question 
of what effects does it have when scientific expert opinions no longer can be identified 
directly in court verdicts since they have become jurisprudence? Literature has outlined that 
it remains very difficult to obtain asylum or refugee status due to one’s sexual orientation in 
Germany. As my empirical cases have shown, credibility is mostly obtained in those cases 
where plaintiffs with the help of expert opinions as evidence are being diagnosed as 
“irreversible” homosexual. Sexual stereotypes also find their share in legal judgements. 
However, while authorities and courts no longer officially request that refugees and asylum 
seekers from sexual minorities pathologies themselves, current legal practices still include 
expert opinions in decision-making. It is difficult to assess whether all of the examined court 
verdicts included ‘expert opinions’ as background knowledge, not all judges might rely on 
such evidence as the following statement outlines: “It does not need an expert opinion to 
come to such an assessment, this assessment can and has to be undertaken by the court in 
the context of the credibility test of the claimant” (VG München 2004).35 Nevertheless, at is 
has been documented throughout the analysis, that the provision of expert opinions increases 
credibility and enables the categorisation of a “fixed and static” sexual orientation, which is 
required for the legal classification of the ‘membership of a particular social group’. It seems 
therefore that this “voluntary involuntariness” has become normalised and become a natural 
part of German jurisprudence. 
                                                          
35 See Appendix A, No. 11 for original German quotation. 
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Another point that I would like to outline can be made in relation to stereotypes and legal 
certainty. Categorisation and stereotypes might as such be unavoidable and are even be seen 
necessary and productive mechanisms through which new knowledges, perspectives and 
rights might appear. However, stereotypes in the German credibility assessment exclude a 
broad number of asylum seekers and refugees from sexual minorities. Firstly, foreigners 
might not tell the “right” narrative that is understood as credible and in accordance with 
“Western” scientific standards. Secondly they might neither appear in certain expected 
stereotypical ways that have been proposed by sexual scientists and decision-makers. When 
occurring in legal decision-making, this particular set of prevailing sexual stereotypes/norms 
in conjunction with the discourse of an “irreversible (homo)sexual orientation” are together 
understood as truths. By reproducing these knowledges and truths through court verdicts, 
these have naturalising and normalising effects which delimit the boundaries for other sexual 
orientations, such as bisexuals or those whose sexuality is “static” and “fundamental part of 
identity”. By connecting sexual stereotypes, and certain scientific truths in legal decision-
making, this “encourages the acceptance and internalization of sexual norms and thus masks 
their normalizing character” (Taylor 2009: 57). However, when sexual scientific expert 
opinions become rejected and instead stereotypes (as common sense) become the governing 
mechanisms for the credibility assessment. Ultimately, this would have consequences for 
legal certainty. Consequently, the credibility assessment might no longer be ruled out from 
the “objective” categories and criteria established by experts, but instead from the basis of 
common sense objectification of stereotypes that are derived from the single judge. This 
ultimately would jeopardise legal certainty.  
 
3.3.4 Summary third Part 
This last analytical chapter focused on categories established by the sexual psychology and 
sexual stereotypes as highly functional mechanism within the credibility assessment that 
have normalising effects on legal decision-making and potentially on jurisprudence. In the 
process of normalisation sexual psychological expert knowledge can assist in the 
normalising dimension in legal decision-making by making certain kinds of knowledges 
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dominant and make them appear as “natural”. Expert opinions are no longer mandatory, but 
I argued that there occurs a “voluntary involuntariness” that has become normalised and 
become a natural part of German jurisprudence. Through this chapter, I have shown that this 
discourse is still is inherent and applied in living law without any direct reference to expert 
opinions.  
Considering the aspects of stereotype, these can develop in different direction. I have shown 
through the two sexual stereotypes “bisexuality” and “sexual minorities as a coherent social 
group’ that the discourse of an “irreversible homosexual disposition” can be related to these 
stereotypes. Thereby, all those sexualities and sexual expression that are not perceived as 
fixed and static become excluded from being understood as credible, lowering the changes 
for credibility. Hence, sexual stereotypes may not only sustain ideas about what is normal 
and abnormal, but also specifically proliferate and cement what is a “natural” and necessary 
basis upon which individual sexualities and subjectivities are based. When stereotypes have 
become jurisprudence, it can distribute certain practices, comparative measures or political 
standards about sexuality and sexual identities apart from being framed as law. However, 
thinking further, when there is no longer any need for expert opinions, but judgement might 
rely on common sense, this would ultimately jeopardise legal certainty. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
With point of departure in the examination of the credibility assessment in German legal 
decision-making dealing with asylum/refugee appeal cases relating to sexual orientation, I 
have shown how sexual psychological scientific lines of reasoning become embedded into 
juridical lines of decision-making. In this last chapter, I will return to my research question: 
How does knowledge derived from the sexual psychological science become constituent in 
the German credibility assessment dealing with asylum/refugee appeal cases relating to 
sexual orientation and what mechanisms are present when governing refugees from sexual 
minorities? 
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In my analysis of an episteme in the German juridical credibility assessment based on sexual 
orientation, I have shown how the sexual psychological science constitutes itself as a natural 
and necessary knowledge dimension that determines the preconditions for the law on 
‘membership of a particular social group’. These classifications and categorisations enable 
the governing of refugees and asylum seekers from sexual minorities. In addition, I have 
outlined how sexual stereotypes, as highly functional mechanisms within legal decision-
making, can contribute to laws quest for social regulation and cohesion by gathering 
individuals under certain societal categories that enable the governing of such groups from 
a distance. 
In part one, I have outlined the sexual psychological categories and criteria, such as ‘age by 
which a sexual orientation fully has developed’ and a ‘static perspective of sexuality and 
identity’ that through the discourse on an ‘irreversible homosexual disposition’ informs legal 
decision-making. Further, I have shown that there exists a reciprocal relationship between 
the law/legal decision-making and sexual psychology. This relationship in matters of ‘sexual 
orientation’ has been manifested through early collaborations of §175 (Penal Code) and the 
1988-Decision, but still prevails in current court verdicts through expert opinions that are 
actively used in living law. In the second part, I have tried to outline what kinds of techniques 
as modes of objectifications are present in legal decision-making, how these operate and 
how these become important productive functions in complementing the episteme upon 
which law relies. In the third part, I focused on those categories established by the sexual 
psychology and sexual stereotypes in court verdicts as highly functional mechanism within 
the credibility assessment that have normalising effects on legal decision-making and 
potentially on jurisprudence and future plaintiffs. 
The 1988-Decision has been a crucial discursive event in German legal decision-making 
opening up a space for the sexual psychology to extend its validity and perceived 
“objectivity” in the domain of asylum and refugee laws. By introducing the discourse of an 
‘irreversible (homo)sexual disposition’ it has created the preconditions and criteria that are 
connected to the assumption that sexuality is a “innate” characteristic which has impact on 
a human’s identity structure and psyche. Scrutinised by scientific standards and detailed 
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examination of the plaintiff, criteria such as ‘age by which a sexual orientation fully has 
developed’ and a ‘static perspective of sexuality and identity’ has shown to be fitting 
preconditions to extract the truth out of plaintiffs’ narratives. For example, puberty and 
sexual orientation are by no means universal and fixed concepts, but part of a sexual 
psychological stance constructed in “Western” liberal cultures aiming at the governing of 
individuals through objectification, classification and examination on a continuum between 
normal and abnormal.  
By filling up the epistemological space required to verify these narratives, the sexual 
psychology successfully and continuously reproduces the almost thirty-year-old discourse 
of an ‘irreversible homosexual disposition’ that still today counts as normalised and 
naturalised notion when assessing a person’s sexual orientation. Further, this kind of 
knowledge does not only sustain ideas about what is normal and abnormal in terms of sexual 
orientations suitable for the law ‘membership of a particular social group’, but also 
specifically proliferates and cements what is a “natural” and necessary foundation upon 
which individual sexualities and subjectivities are based” (Taylor 2009: 57). Hence, expert 
knowledge in the form of expert opinions enable that certain kinds of truths can become 
“fixed” in time through its written and reproduced material. This might not be valid 
knowledge for the whole of the German judiciary, however it still has been used for many 
years and thus might be a “natural” part of jurisprudence.  
Although the German government claims that expert opinions no longer are required in the 
credibility assessment, I argued that there occurs a “voluntary involuntariness” that requires 
asylum seekers/refugees from sexual minorities to provide this evidence as to increase the 
possibility for showing that their narratives are true. Thereby this “voluntary 
involuntariness” has become normalised and become a natural part of German jurisprudence. 
Potential effects of this jurisprudence therefore can go beyond the mere objectification, but 
could target plaintiffs on their individuality and the subjective technologies that transform 
objects into subjects of governance and self-governance. Ultimately, these practices in 
German legal decision-making encourage the acceptance of the discourse of an “irreversible 
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homosexual disposition” as being the only credible “truth” within the credibility assessment, 
and thereby mask the normalisation character of the knowledge and powers behind. 
Finally, as the two stereotypes on ‘bisexuality’ and ‘sexual minorities as coherent social 
group’ has shown, I have argued that these have a relation to the discourse of an ‘irreversible 
(homo)sexual disposition’. It seems therefore that all those sexualities and sexual expression 
that are not perceived as fixed and static become excluded from being understood as credible, 
lowering the changes in the credibility assessment. By connecting sexual stereotypes, and 
certain scientific truths in legal decision-making, this encourages the acceptance and 
internalisation of specific sexual stereotypes and thereby can mask their normalising 
character. This becomes especially difficult for all those individuals who are not familiar 
with these kinds of “Western” stereotypes or those who resist the objectification. Despite 
some reference in court verdicts, it seems that expert knowledge more and more operates as 
background knowledge. If judges however continuously rely on sexual stereotypes as 
guiding knowledge, categorisation and classification of objects by means of intuitive 
knowledge would therefore trigger potential consequences for legal certainty. Instead of 
being governed through the categories and criteria of the sexual science, this would then 
enable the governing through common sense and legal certainty would be jeopardised. 
Hence, legal certainty might rely from a ‘legal security point of view’ to some extend on 
knowledges from the sexual psychology, as the human sciences operate from similar 
“perceived” standards of objectivity and validity. Nonetheless and as a result, the rights of 
refugee status and asylum relating to sexual orientation might signify freedom from sexual 
repression, but it simultaneously places individuals within similar oppressive discursive 
boundaries. The proposed liberal rights for asylum seekers and refugees denote hence a 
regulated freedom. 
 
4.1 Further Research: Governing Refugees through Rights and Truths 
Recalling the findings of my literature review, it became evident that almost no research 
exists on my specific topic for the German context or research within the sociology of law 
that focus on how techniques of power and knowledge within legal systems create certain 
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scientific categories or sexual stereotypes about refugees/asylum seekers from sexual 
minorities. In this study, I therefore sought to contribute to this debate with a new analytical 
focus, while also providing some new evidence from the German administrative courts that 
decided upon asylum/refugee appeal cases based on sexual orientation.  
While this archaeological study focused on the epistemic nature in conjunction with modes 
of objectification and mechanisms of normalization observable in the German credibility 
assessment, this study could have gained substantially by extending this approach with a 
genealogy.  This would show how refugees/asylum seekers from “non-Western” countries 
firstly are made objects of governance through the reciprocal relationship between sexual 
psychology, legal decision-making and jurisprudence. Following Foucault’s lines of thought, 
plaintiffs would be targeted on their individuality by activating subjective technologies that 
transform objects into subjects of governance and self-governance. Substituting this 
approach with the dimension of how refugee law and sexual rights discourse are formative 
of identity, or rather mechanisms of inscriptions as proposed by Golder (2013), it would be 
interesting to investigate what types of subjects are produced by the classificatory space of 
irreversible homosexual refugee/asylum seeker versus the discourse of self-determination. 
Potentially, this could add the dimensions of freedom and resistance that Foucault examined 
in detail. In Extension, an inclusion of transgender cases would have been interesting to 
explore, since the same analytical framework and purpose of this study would have been 
applicable for the discursive scientific-legal preconditions for transgender cases under the 
‘particular social group’ classification. Especially ethnographic observations as methods 
would be a good complement to the court verdicts or protocols from oral proceedings. 
Apart from focusing on rights as mechanisms of inscriptions that generate certain 
subjectivities, it would equally be fruitful to extend my proposed analytical approach with 
the focus of truth-telling/avowal/confession in German oral proceedings and oral 
examination conducted by sexual psychologists. While this might appear as a neutral 
exercise, the “imperative to narrate one’s own experience over and over again” functions as 
highly effective method of political individualisation (Golder 2013: 12- 13). Hence, while 
an archaeology including the written expert opinions could bring to light the epistemological 
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categories that arise in these two different forms, a genealogy in extension could include 
ethnographic observations of oral proceedings and expert examinations. Both the governing 
through rights and truths would appear as highly applicable analytical dimension that can be 
fruitful for the sociology of law and the overall topic. 
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6. APPENDIX 
Original German Quotations: 
 
No. 1 
 
„Auf Grund des Vorbringens des Klägers und seiner Lebensführung sei 
eindeutig feststellbar, dass bei ihm gerade nicht eine irreversible 
schicksalhafte und unumkehrbare Festlegung einer homosexuellen Prägung 
vorliege“ (VG Ansbach, 21.08.2008, AN 18 K 08.30201). 
 
No. 2 „Dabei geht das Gericht zu Gunsten der Klägerin davon aus, dass eine 
irreversible homosexuelle Veranlagung bei ihr vorliegt. Nach der 
Rechtsprechung des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts stellt die Bestrafung 
irreversibler, schicksalhafter Homosexualität grundsätzlich politische 
Verfolgung im Sinne des Art. 16 Abs. 1 GG dar (…) (VG Bayreuth 2012), 
05.03.2012, B 3 K 11.30113). 
 
No. 3 „ (…) daß es sich hierbei nicht um eine bloße Neigung handelt, der 
nachzugeben mehr oder weniger im Belieben des Klägers stünde, sondern 
daß in dessen Person im Sinne einer irreversiblen Prägung eine unentrinnbare 
schicksalhafte Festlegung auf homosexuelles Verhalten gegeben ist, die das 
Gefühlsleben des Klägers einschließlich seines sexuellen Verhaltens seit 
seinem 15. oder 16. Lebensjahr bestimmt“ (BVerwG, Urteil vom 15. März 
1988 - 9 C 278.86) 
 
No. 4 „(…) These von der freien Bestimmbarkeit der sexuellen Triebrichtung“ 
(BVerwG, Urteil vom 15. März 1988 - 9 C 278.86) 
 
No. 5 „ [a]uch hier gilt, daß von den Erscheinungsformen gleichgeschlechtlicher 
Betätigung keine werbende Wirkung auf normal empfindende Menschen 
ausgeht“ (BT-Drucks. 5/4094) 
 
No. 6 „Nach diesem Gutachten verfügt ein sehr großer Teil gerade auch der 
männlichen Jugendlichen, wenn sie das achtzehnte Lebensjahr erreichen, 
über (hetero-) sexuelle Erfahrungen, die gegenüber homosexuellen 
Einflüssen immunisierend wirken. Auch die psychische Reife ist bei 
Personen ab achtzehn Jahren in der Regel soweit entwickelt, daß diese 
weitgehend selbständig und eigenverantwortlich zu handeln in der Lage 
sind“ (BT-Drucks. 6/3521: 30). 
 
No. 7 „Der Kläger hat im Rahmen seiner Anhörung vor dem Bundesamt erklärt, 
erste homosexuelle Kontakte habe er während seiner Wehrdienstzeit gehabt. 
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(…) Das Gericht hat keine Zweifel an der Richtigkeit diese Aussagen, zumal 
der Kläger gegenüber dem Klinikum der ... Universität gleichlautende 
Angaben machte und das erstellte sexualwissenschaftlich-psychologische 
Gutachten zu dem Ergebnis kommt, bei dem Kläger liege ein irreversible 
homosexuelle Veranlagung vor.”  (VG Wiesbaden, 24. 09. 2008, 6 K 
478/08.WI.A(2)). 
 
No. 8 „Soweit in der Klagebegründung (…) vorgetragen wird, in dem eingeholten 
Gutachten (…) werde festgestellt, dass bei dem Kläger eine irreversible 
Homosexualität vorliege, ist dies nicht nachzuvollziehen. Denn 
offensichtlich ist ein solches Gutachten noch nicht erstellt (…) [und] ein 
solches [wurde] auch nicht bei Gericht eingereicht (…)”(VG Ansbach, 
21.08.2008, AN 18 K 08.30201). 
 
No. 9 „Beim Kläger fehlt es nach Überzeugung der Kammer an einer 
Identitätsprägung in diesem Sinne, denn seinem eigenen Vorbringen zufolge 
war seine Homosexualität auch nach Abschluss der Pubertät, dem Zeitpunkt, 
zudem nach heutigem Wissenschaftsstand spätestens eine schicksalhafte 
Festlegung auf homosexuelles Verhalten vorliegt, nicht mehr als eine bloße 
Neigung neben der von ihm auch gelebten Heterosexualität“ (VG Ansbach , 
21.08.2008, AN 18 K 08.30201). 
 
No. 
10 
„Schon die Geschichte, wie es bei dem Kläger dazu kam, dass dieser im Jahr 
2002 mit über 40 Jahren seine gleichgeschlechtliche sexuelle Orientierung 
erkannte, überzeugte nicht.“ (VG Düsseldorf, 23.04.2012 (23 K 8414/09.A). 
 
No. 
11 
„Für eine solche Wertung bedarf es keines Gutachtens, diese Wertung kann 
und muss durch das Gericht im Rahmen der Glaubwürdigkeitsprüfung des 
Klägers durchgeführt werden” (VG München 20.01.2004, M 9 K 03.51197) 
 
No. 
12 
„Zu Recht hat das Bundesamt dieses Vorbringen als insgesamt unglaubhaft 
gewertet. Gegen die Glaubhaftigkeit der Angaben spricht bereits, dass der 
Antragsteller zwischenzeitlich eine heterosexuelle Beziehung unterhält und 
beabsichtigt, die Ehe mit dieser Frau einzugehen, und irreversibel 
homosexuelle Neigung jedenfalls nicht bestehen, obwohl der Antragsteller 
dies in seiner Anhörung beim Bundesamt behauptet und nicht erklärt hat, er 
sei bisexuell veranlagt.“ (VG Berlin, 04.03.2009, 23 L 61.09 A (unpubl.)). 
 
No. 
13 
„Der Kläger wäre nämlich auch aufgrund seiner Veranlagung in der Lage, 
auch mit einer Frau in Algerien eine Partnerschaft zu führen und seine 
Sexualität auszuleben. Diese Annahme wird dadurch gestützt, dass der 
Kläger in Deutschland bereits Vater eines Kindes geworden ist.“ (VG 
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Saarland, 23.01.2015, 5 K 534/13: 11-12) 
No. 
14 
„Auf Vorhalt, dass die Tatsache, dass er offensichtlich auch mit einer Frau 
Geschlechtsverkehr gehabt habe, bedeute, dass seine Homosexualität nicht 
eindeutig und irreversibel sei, gab der Kläger an, dies sei zutreffend, aber er 
neige mehr zu Männern. Befragt, ob er derzeit homosexuellen Sex 
praktiziere, gab der Kläger an, hier nicht, zuletzt in Holland.” (VG Ansbach, 
21.08.2008, 18 K 08.30201). 
 
No. 
15 
„So findet sich in der schriftlichen Asylantragstellung durch seine 
Verfahrensbevollmächtigte lediglich der pauschale Hinweis auf die 
Homosexualität des Antragstellers, aber keinerlei konkrete Angaben 
beispielsweise zum Outing oder zum Engagement in schwul-lesbischen 
Vereinigungen“ (VG Berlin, 27. 05. 2014, 33L195.14.A (unpubl.)). 
 
No. 
16 
„Die Klägerin hat durch ihre maskuline Erscheinung und die lebendige 
Schilderung ihrer Identität mit den daraus folgenden Problemen und 
Gefahren im Iran glaubhaft gemacht, dass sie zu einer [‚particular social‘] 
Gruppe gehört (…). Ihre homosexuelle Ausrichtung (…) ist schicksalhafter 
Bestandteil ihrer Gesamtpersönlichkeit (…)“ (VG Stuttgart, 29.06.2006, A 
11 K 10841/04). 
 
No. 
17 
„(…) wenn die sexuelle Veranlagung nicht verborgen bleibt, sondern – wie 
im Falle des Klägers – offenbar wird. Nach dem Eindruck, den das Gericht 
gewonnen hat, kann der Kläger seine sexuelle Orientierung nämlich nicht 
verbergen. Sie kommt nicht etwa in aufdringlicher Aufmachung (…) zum 
Ausdruck, sondern in seiner ihn prägenden körperlichen Erscheinung und 
Körpersprache, die er nach dem Eindruck, den das Gericht in den Terminen 
zur mündlichen Verhandlung nachhaltig gewonnen hat, nicht verstellen 
kann“ (VG Düsseldorf, 01.09.2004, 5 K 1367/00.A). 
 
 
 
 
 
